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I. INTRODUCTION
There is nothing like the property tax. It is the primary source of revenues
controlled by our local governments, yet it is one of the most unpopular taxes. It is
the target of recurring popular revolts establishing limits on the tax, yet tax rates
consistently find a way to rebound. It is attacked as the worst tax and its demise
frequently-predicted, yet it has been around in various forms for thousands of years
and is likely to remain with us for decades to come.
The property tax is the most difficult of all taxes to administer. With every form of
ad valorem tax, there are four key steps: determining what property is subject to the
tax, determining the value of that property, establishing the rate of taxation, and
collecting the tax. The fourth step of collecting the tax should be the easiest to
administer, particularly in light of the fact that in virtually every jurisdiction an ad
valorem tax lien achieves priority over all other liens and encumbrances on the
property. The experience of our state and local governments, however, has been to
the contrary.
If our federal system of government is intended, at least in part, to permit
experimentation among our various states in achieving the best forms of governance,
then there should be clear models of excellence and efficiency in the collection of this
tax. Instead, there are over 150 different systems in the United States for collecting
the property tax. Most states have at least two entirely different approaches for
enforcing payment of the property tax, with one procedure having its origins in the
mid-nineteenth century and an alternative second procedure, equally available for use
by local governments, having been developed in the middle of the twentieth century.
Other states leave the enforcement of the property tax to local governments, with little
consistency in procedures as one moves from city to city and from county to county
across a state.
The property tax is predominantly a local tax. While the property tax has declined
in recent decades, as a percentage of the total revenues available to local
governments, it continues to be predominant among the sources 6f revenue that are
within the control of our cities, counties, and school districts. As responsibility for
social programs shifts from the federal government to state and local governments,
increasing financial pressure is placed on local governments. The efficient and fair
enforcement of payment of property taxes becomes paramount.
Collection of delinquent property taxes is not for the faint hearted.' Property
owners don't want to pay these taxes, and local governments frequently don't want
to collect them or else prefer to sell the right to collect them to private third parties.
There are no uniform laws on enforcement of property tax liens, and few title
insurance companies will insure title derived from a tax sale. Federal courts have
historically stayed away from issues involving the administration of property taxes,
and state courts have routinely set aside tax sales, insisting on exact compliance with
statutory procedures. Despite the unappealing nature of the subject matter, collection
of delinquent property taxes must be done. Failure to enforce payment of such taxes
1. "For most mortals, mere mention of property tax administration is sufficient to make
eyes glaze over and heads nod." HENRY J. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX?: ANEw
VIEW 56 (1975).
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in a fair and efficient manner can have a devastating impact on property owners, on
neighborhoods, and on local governments.
Nonpayment of property taxes tends to occur in three contexts. The first is when
general economic conditions depress property values, or incomes, or both. Assessed
values as established by the government may be too high, failing to reflect
neighborhood declines in actual value. In times of economic recession property
owners may simply lack the income to pay the annual tax. The second context is
when property tax rates exceed the level of popular tolerance, and nonpayment is a
form of public protest. The third context occurs when property owners, usually
investors, elect to maximize income derived from the property by forgoing payment
of the property taxes, eventually abandoning the property. This occurs most
commonly in major urban areas which have experienced residential and commercial
flight to the suburbs. Tax delinquent properties become a cause of accelerating
neighborhood deterioration and a further drain on public revenues.
After centuries of deference to state autonomy in the field of property tax
collection, the United States Supreme Court in 1983 confronted the deceptively
simple question of the application of due process notice requirements to the
foreclosure of a property tax lien. In Mennonite BoardofMissions v. Adams, 2 Elkhart
County, Indiana conducted a routine tax foreclosure, publishing notice of the pending
sale once a week for three weeks in accordance with state law. Following completion
of the sale, the purchaser initiated an action to quiet title, necessitated in all likelihood
by its inability to obtain title insurance based on a tax sale. In this subsequent
proceeding, a lender which held a properly recorded mortgage on the property
challenged the adequacy of notice to it by publication. The Supreme Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment guaranty of due process3 requires that a government
conducting a tax foreclosure sale provide notice to a mortgagee of the pending
foreclosure sale.
Confirming what most title insurance companies had suspected for decades, this
decision of the United States Supreme Court cast into doubt the majority of property
tax lien and tax sale procedures used throughout the United States. The decision was
deceptively simple. Though the particular holding on the facts of the case was clear,
the application of the holding has been subject to a wide range of interpretations.
Reluctant to create bright lines of universally applicable rights and duties, the Court
concluded that a party holding a "legally protected property interest ' 4 whose name
and address are "reasonably ascertainable"' based upon "reasonably diligent efforts"6
is entitled to notice "reasonably calculated"" to inform it of the proceeding. This open
textured rule of law has left for further debate four subsidiary questions: (1) What
events, or stages, in a property tax enforcement proceediig give rise to the
requirement of adequate notice? (2) What property interests are entitled to more than
2. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
3. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
4. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.
5. Id at 800.
6. Id at 798 n.4.
7. Id at 798.
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notice by publication? (3) How is the existence of the interests to be ascertained? (4)
What efforts are required in order to identify accurate addresses of the interested
parties?
In the sixteen years since the Mennonite decision, a large number of the states have
modified, or entirely rewritten, their laws on tax liens and tax sales. Even though
Mennonite established common constitutional minimum requirements of notice in
such proceedings, there is virtually no consensus among the state and local taxing
jurisdictions on the application of the constitutional requirements to these four
subsidiary questions, with many courts and commentators blending inappropriately
the analysis of two or more questions. The lack of common interpretation leaves the
procedures of a large number ofjurisdictions subject to constitutional challenge. It
also leads to dramatic inefficiencies in the collection of taxes, inconsistent rules and
standards, and impairs the ability of local governments and property owners alike to
anticipate enforcement of the obligation to pay property taxes. Clarity in the due
process notice requirements is necessary in each of the four subsidiary questions.
Complexity, rather than clarity and simplicity, characterizes property tax collection
procedures in most jurisdictions. The procedures of many jurisdictions fall short of
the Mennonite constitutional standards. Few states offer a procedure which permits
a clear answer to the first subsidiary question: Which events trigger constitutional
notice requirements? Many jurisdictions currently utilize procedures involving two,
three, or four distinct steps to enforce a property tax lien. Some states conduct two
sales-an initial sale ofthe property or the lien, followed by a statutory period of time
before a final sale. Others conduct a sale of the property, followed by a statutory
redemption period. These multiple steps in the tax lien foreclosure process were
commonly added to state procedures partially out of concern of the adequacy of
notice to the delinquent taxpayer or other interested parties. The question arises
whether notice must be given at each step of these proceedings, only at the initial
step, or perhaps only at the final step in the enforcement proceeding. Unfortunately,
since Mennonite, tax lien foreclosure procedures have tended to become more
complex rather than clearer and simpler. This result simply does not have to follow
from the creation of a constitutional floor of notice requirements.
The Mennonite decision held that adequate notice must be given to any party
holding a "legally protected property interest."' The second subsidiary question is the
essential nature of these legally protected property interests, and this question has
received inconsistent treatment by state and federal courts. For reasons which are not
clear, judgment creditors are frequently not extended the same statutory notice as is
given to mortgagees. Similar results occur in examining the rights of lessees and other
occupants of the property, of purchasers under land sales contracts, and of the holders
of easements and covenants. The result is that while a mortgage is now recognized
as a legally protected property interest for these purposes, constitutional doubt is cast
on tax lien foreclosure proceedings when any of these other parties do not receive
appropriate notice. Tax lien and tax sale purchasers, as well as title insurance
companies, remain at risk whenever adequate notice is not given to the holders of a
legally protected property interest.
8. Id.
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The third subsidiary question involves the task of identifying the property interests
relevant to the tax enforcement proceeding. Examination of the records of the tax
collector is certainly required, and the strong implication of Mennonite is that a title
examination of public records is also necessary. Though a substantial number of
jurisdictions now require atitle examination as part of the process, many jurisdictions
are reluctant to impose such responsibilities on government entities seeking to
enforce collection of property taxes.
The widest range of interpretation occurs with respect to the fourth subsidiary
question-the nature and scope of the reasonably diligent efforts which must be
undertaken to identify correct names and addresses of parties holding the various
protected property interests. Most jurisdictions are content simply to mail notice to
the last known address found in the official public records, but increasingly courts are
holding that when letters are returned, the governmental actors must do something
more to identify a correct name or address. The tension between the presumed
responsibility of property owners to provide correct addresses, and the duty of the
government to undertake reasonable steps to notify owners of the pending loss of
property, is greatest in this context.
The lack of clarity about the constitutional requirements applicable to property tax
foreclosure procedures profoundly affects the social and financial stability of a local
government. Ineffective and inefficient procedures encourage tax delinquency and
the abandonment of inner city properties. As financial burdens on local governments
increase, the fiscal impact of a 3%, or 10%, delinquency rate in property tax
collections becomes dramatic. Over the past decade local governments have
increasingly looked to private entities to assist in the collection of property taxes, a
return in some ways to the Roman era of "tax farming" or the nineteenth-century
reliance on "tax ferrets" or "tax scavengers." It is with a late twentieth-century twist,
however, that local governments are beginning to sell, or "securitize," large volumes
of delinquent tax liens in bulk transactions. The dilemma here is simply whether the
financial markets, or bulk tax lien purchasers, appreciate the constitutional questions
which may taint the enforceability of the underlying tax liens.
This Article examines the constitutional requirements of notice in the context of
property tax lien enforcement procedures in order that clarity and simplicity may lead
to a more just and more efficient method of enforcing the collection of such taxes.
Part II of this Article describes the context of property taxes in state and local
government finance, the evolution of property tax collection procedures, and the
recent trend towards the sale and securitization of tax liens. It also traces the evolution
of constitutional due process as applied to tax lien enforcement, culminating in the
Mennonite decision.
An examination of the property tax foreclosure procedures used throughout the
United States is set forth in Part III. It describes the varied reliance on nonjudicial
foreclosure methods and judicial proceedings, as well as those jurisdictions which use
a combination of approaches. It summarizes the usage of redemption periods, both
pre-sale and post-sale, as well as the mechanics of the sale processes themselves.
Part IV of this Article evaluates the application of the constitutional theory to the
practice of property tax lien enforcement procedures. The interpretation of the
Mennonite requirements, and the questions left open by Mennonite, by state and
federal courts, and by state legislatures, are examined in detail. Trends towards clear
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and consistent interpretations are noted, as are the issues upon which there is still
wide divergence.
A proposal for a clear, just, and efficient application of the constitutional
requirements in this field is set forth in Part V. Drawn from the vast marketplace of
procedures used throughout the country, the proposal builds upon the constitutional
floor of fairness to holders of property interests and enhances efficient enforcement
of property tax liens.
II. THE CONTEXT
Governments have derived revenues by taxing the value of property for thousands
of years. Though property taxation has at times included taxation of tangible and
intangible personal property,9 it is the taxation of interests in real property which has
been the dominant source of revenues for local governments in the United States.'
Real property taxation occurs by the establishment of the fair market value of the
property," and the imposition of a rate of taxation, a millage rate,' upon the taxable
value.'3 Much of the history of real property taxation has focused on the difficulties
of establishing values, and on creating different rates of taxation for different classes
of real property.
In contrast, the procedures for enforcement of property taxes, once these taxes are
properly established and levied, have rarely been the focus of careful scrutiny.
Collecting the revenues remains essential in light of the importance of these revenues
9. See Alfred G. Buehler, Personal Properly Taxation, in PROPERTY TAXES 117-34
(1940). Buehler predicted that "[Ihe common evasion and growing exemption of personal
property from property taxation may, in time, cause its complete abandonment in the United
States." Id. at 133. Such prediction has proven accurate, as personal property taxes provide a
de minimis amount of revenue to state and local governments today. See Arthur D. Lynn, Jr.,
The Property Tax, in MANAGEIENT POLICIES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 99-102 (J.
Richard Aronson & Eli Schwartz eds., 1975); see also Harold M. Groves, Property Taxation
of Intangibles, in PROPERTY TAXATION USA 117-30 (Richard W. Lindholm ed., 1967).
10. The term "property tax" is used in this Article to refer to ad valorem taxes assessed and
levied upon interests in real property, as opposed to tangible and intangible personal property.
This tax is distinguishable from fees or charges which are levied in response to specific actions
such as sidewalk improvements or water or sanitation fees. The real property tax is generally
taxation for provision of general revenues to the governmental entity as opposed to payment
for a specific service or fee. The relative importance of charges, fees, and assessments in local
government finance has increased significantly over the past forty years as public pressure has
mounted against increases in the real property taxes. See C. KurtZorn, User Charges andFees,
in LOCAL GOvERNmENT FINANCE 135 (John E, Petersen & Denis R. Strachota eds., 1991).
11. The determination of the fair market value of property subject to taxation is one of the
most difficult, and most controversial, aspects of the administration of the real property tax.
12. The "millage rate" is the amount of tax per $1000 of taxable value. A tax of twenty
mills is a tax of $20 per $1000 of taxable value.
13. Jurisdictions vary in their approaches of requiring that the tax be levied against the full
fair market value of the property, or against some percentage of the fair market value-the
"assessed valuation."
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to the provision of services by local governments. The United States Supreme Court,
in Mennonite, fundamentally altered the manner in which delinquent property taxes
can be collected.
A. Real Property Taxation in State and
Local Government Finance
Property taxation is consistently described as one of the worst forms of taxation
from virtually every perspective, 14 even when compared with other forms of
taxation. 5 Its demise has been regularly predicted,16 and yet it manages to survive.
"The property tax is nothing if not durable. It has been decried for generations as one
of the worst of taxes, yet it remains the pillar of local government finance."' 7
14. One expert noted:
"Practically, the general property tax as actually administered is beyond all
doubt one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world.... It puts a premium
on dishonesty and debauches the public conscience; it reduces deception to a
system, and makes a science of knavery; it presses hardest on those least able to
pay; it imposes double taxation on one man and grants entire immunity to the
next. In short, the general property tax is so flagrantly inequitable, that its
retention can be explained only through ignorance or inertia. It is the cause of
such crying injustice that its alternation or its abolition must become the battle cry
of every statesman and reformer."
ArthurD. Lynn, Jr., Property TaxDevelopment: SelectedHistorical Perspective, in PROPERTY
TAXATION USA, supra note 9, at 7-8 (emphasis in original) (omission added) (quoting E.R.A.
Seligman, The General Property Tax, in ESSAYS IN TAXATION 62 (1921)).
15. "'IT]he quality of administration of the property tax is universally worse than the
quality of administration we have come to expect in connection with income and sales taxes."'
TmE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 4 (Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., ed., 1969) (alteration
added) (emphasis in original) (quoting DickNetzer, SomeAlternatives in Property TaxReform,
33 TAX POL'Y 12 (1966)).
16. "Over the next two decades, I would expect to see the property tax all but wither away.
Further relative decline is a foregone conclusion, but I would go beyond this and predict that
in absolute terms, the property tax is headed for oblivion." George W. Mitchell, Is This Where
We Came in?, Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual Conference on Taxation 492 (1957),
quoted in Michael E. Bell & John H. Bowman, Property Taxes, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCE, supra note 10, at 109.
17. William Gorham, Foreword to PROPERTY TAX REFORM at v (George E. Peterson ed.,
1973). Part of the inherent difficulty with the property tax is that there is little consensus on
its underlying policy justification. It originated as a tax on general wealth with clear historical
parallels. The closest historical analogy to our present real estate ad valorem tax is probably
the "Fifteenth and Tenth" which was "originally a levy of one-tenth on property in the royal
demesne, towns and cities, and one-fifteenth on property elsewhere." M.J. BRADDICK,
PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
AND RESPONSE23 (1994). This particular tax has historical origins in the Saladin tithe of 1188.
See JENS PETER JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1931); see also
Lynn, supra note 14, at 9-10. The property tax in the United States has had a schizophrenic
identity. It has been perceived by some to be in essence a wealth tax, while others have viewed
it more narrowly as a tax on the income producing potential of land. See JENSEN, supra, at 48-
49; Harold M. Groves, Is the Property Tax Conceptually and Practically Administrable?, in
2000]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
Opposition to the property tax derives from numerous sources.' Much of the
criticism pertains to the relative accuracy, or inaccuracy, of the determination of fair
market value. 9 A second source of criticism stems from the use of differential
classifications of property, resulting in widely disparate tax levels.2" A third criticism
has focused on the regressive nature of the tax in imposing much higher tax burdens
on lower income families.2' On a recurring basis there have been widespread public
revolts against the property tax, imposing limitations on the ability of governments
to increase the taxes,22 or creating various forms of "circuit breakers" to protect
certain uses of property, or certain classes of property owners.'
In terms of total government revenues and expenditures, there has been a steady
decline in the relative significance of the property tax. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, property taxes provided over 80% ofallrevenues received by state
and local governments.24 This reliance on the property tax to finance government
operations continued through the Great Depression, but gradually declined as state
and local governments increased reliance on income taxes, sales taxes, and
intergovernmental transfers. By 1948 property taxes comprised only 35% of all state
and local general revenue, and this had dropped further, to 21%, by 1978.' Since
THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15, at 15, 20-24.
18. See generally George E. Peterson, The Issues of Property Tax Reform, in PROPERTY
TAX REFORM, supra note 17, at 1.
19. See Henry Aaron, Some Observations on Property Tax Valuation and the Significance
of Full Value Assessment, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15,
at 153. There are over 15,000 separate units of government in the United States which assess
property for ad valorem tax purposes. See GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY
OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 197 (1996).
20. See FISHER, supra note 19, at 45-62.
21. "No other major tax in our public finance system bears down so harshly on low-income
households, or is so capriciously related to the flow of cash into the household." John Shannon,
The Property Tax: Reform or Relief, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 17, at 25, 26; see
Howard Chemick & Andrew Reschovsky, The Taxation of the Poor, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES
712-35 (1990); see also STEVEN DAVID GOLD, PROPERTY TAX RELIEF 16-17 (1979)
(summarizing the evolving perspectives on the regressivity of the property tax).
22. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX AND
EXPENDITURE LIMITS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 11-42 (1995).
23. See AARON, supra note 1, at 72-75; GOLD, supra note 21; Henry Aaron, What Do
Circuit Breaker Laws Accomplish?, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 17, at 53. Aaron
argues that "circuit-breakers" tend to confer tax benefits on higher income families rather than
the reverse, and that the regressive features of the property tax should be offset by an income
support payment to low-income families.
24. See JENSEN, supra note 17, at 2. Professor Jensen's treatise was the first comprehensive
analysis of property taxation in the United States, and remains one of the leading historical and
economic reference texts today. He observed in 1931, "From a fiscal point of view property
taxes are now and always have been more important than any other tax, and for state and local
purposes in the United States, more important than all other taxes together." Id. at 1.
25. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 2 SIGNIFICANT
FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 115 tbl. 57 (1992) [hereinafter FISCAL FEDERALISM 1992].
In 1948 individual income taxes provided 3.1% of state and local general revenues. By 1978
this had increased to 10.5%. See id. If one focuses solely on state and local taxes (excluding
[Vol. 75:747
TAX LIENS, TAX SALES, AND DUE PROCESS
1978 the percentage of aggregate state and local general revenues derived by state
and local governments from the property tax has remained consistent at
approximately 18%.26
Despite this decline in the relative significance of the property tax, there are three
vitally important reasons to continue to focus on the proper administration of the
property tax as we enter the twenty-first century. First, the property tax remains the
primary source of revenues which can be controlled by our local governments, and
thus is central to their financial health. Second, given the sheer magnitude of revenues
derived from the property tax, and the constant rate of increase in these revenues, the
property tax remains a significant aspect of our governmental finance structure.
Third, so long as the property tax continues to exist, the failure to enforce collection
of delinquent property taxes is destructive to the social and financial health of our
cities.
The property tax is a local tax. The federal government derives no revenue from
the property tax, and state governments receive less than 4% of all property tax
revenues.27 For the past forty years local governments and special districts have
received over 96% of all property tax revenues." It is the central method by which
local governments can, on their own initiative and within their own control, impose
taxes to finance government services. The property tax has provided approximately
three-quarters of all tax revenues raised solely by local governments since 1980.29 It
continues to provide roughly 29% of all general revenues available to the local
governments." Certain forms of governmental entities are even more dependent on
the property tax. Approximately 41% of all property tax revenues are paid to school
districts, comprising 97% of the total tax revenues received by these districts.3'
Even though property tax revenues declined in the relative percentage of aggregate
state and local revenues in recent decades, the amount of property tax revenues, in
absolute terms, has grown dramatically. In 1957 the aggregate national revenue from
the property tax was $12.8 billion;32 by 1992 it was $178 billion.33 The annual rate of
growth in property tax revenues has ranged from 6.2% to 10.5% over the past fifty
years,34 and has consistently equalled 2.4% to 2.9% of the gross domestic national
nontax revenues and federal governmental transfers), property taxes constituted 44.1% of all
state and local taxes in 1965, and between 30.7% and 32.1% of such taxes since 1980. See
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOvERNmENTAL RELATIONS, 2 SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM 97 tbl. 53 (1994) [hereinafter FISCAL FEDERALISM 1994].
26. See FISCAL FEDERALISM 1992, supra note 25, at 115 tbl. 57.
27. See id. at 124 tbl. 64.
28. See id
29. See FISCAL FEDERALISM 1994, supra note 25, at 118 tl. 64.
30. See FISCAL FEDERALISM 1992, supra note 25, at 119 tbl. 61. Between 1979 and 1990,
this percentage remained constant between 28.0% and 29.5%. See id.
31. See id. at 124 tbl. 64, 127 tbl. 65.
32. See id. at 124 tbl. 64.
33. See FISCAL FEDERALISM 1994, supra note 25, at 70 tbl. 36.
34. See FISCAL FEDERALISM 1992, supra note 25, at 129 tbl. 66. The only exception to this
was during the period from 1978-80, in which the annual rate of increase was only 1.2%. This
is attributable to the popular initiatives in California and Massachusetts severely limiting, or
reducing, property taxes. See Dick Netzer, Property Taxes: Their Past, Present, and Future
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product since 1980.11 There is little evidence that total property tax revenues will do
anything other than at least keep pace with the financial health of this country.
The property tax is resilient and durable simply because local governments have
few other options available to fund local services. Governmental transfers, made
possible primarily through federal block grant and revenue sharing programs, had a
significant positive impact on revenues available to local governments in the 1960s
and 1970s. By the mid-1980s, however, general federal revenue sharing with local
governments had come to an end, and the rate of increase in federal
intergovernmental transfers declined dramatically." In coming years local
governments will be under increasing pressure to fund programs and services from
revenues within their control, and, absent radical reformulation of tax systems, this
will continue the reliance on the property tax."' "The question we must ask is: How
will local governments respond to this challenge? The short answer to this question
is that they will return to what has always been the backbone of local government
finance: the property tax.'"
The failure to collect even a small portion of property taxes can have a dramatic
impact on local governments. A delinquency rate of 2% or 4% in the collection of
these taxes translates into $3-6 billion in revenues lost nationally to local
governments and, in particular, to school districts. Local governments have usually
imposed some combination of penalties and interest on delinquent taxes, but this
alone does not suffice to deter property tax delinquencies.39 Little attention has been
devoted to the study of the various methods of property tax collection, and what study
has been conducted has been in the aftermath of a general economic collapse
resulting in declining property values and spiraling delinquency rates.4" In the middle
of the economic depression in 1933, delinquencies exceeded 20% of aggregate
property tax assessments, 4' and a model tax collection statute was drafted in an
attempt to address some of the barriers to enforcement. 42
Place in Government Finance, in URBAN FINANCE UNDER SIEGE 51,65-66 (Thomas R. Swartz
& Frank J. Bonello eds., 1993). In 1991-92 the rate of growth was 6.2%. See FISCAL
FEDERALISM, supra note 25, at 72 tbl. 37.
35. See FISCAL FEDERALISM 1994, supra note 25, at 73 tbl. 38.
36. See Thomas R. Swartz, Rethinking Urban Finance in America, in URBAN FINANCE
UNDER SIEGE, supra note 34, at 3, 9.
37. "Federal grants-in-aid, once dominating the fiscal landscape, remain significant but are
receding in importance. State governments, in response, are reappraising program spending
priorities. Local governments are becoming more reliant on own-source revenues." James
Edwin Kee & John J. Forrer, Intergovernmental Revenues, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE,
supra note 10, at 153, 153.
38. Swartz, supra note 36, at 10 (emphasis in original).
39. Forasummary of current penalties and interest charges levied for delinquent taxes, see
infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
40. "Of all the stages in the administration of the general property tax, the final stage, that
of collecting the taxes extended on the roll, is the least explored, yet most in need of careful
study." JENSEN, supra note 17, at 307.
41. See Leo Day Woodworth, Importance ofProperty Tax in State and Local Tax Systems,
in PROPERTY TAXES, supra note 9, at 3, 12.
42. See Frederick L. Bird, Relation of Tax Collection Methods to Delinquency, in
PROPERTY TAXES, supra note 9, at 254, 256; infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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The direct loss of funds to local governments is just one part of the harm caused by
property tax delinquencies. An equal, if not greater, harm occurs when property
owners simply elect to abandon properties as the amount of delinquent tax
approaches the value of the property. Decaying inner city neighborhoods in our larger
cities are testimonies of the effect of abandoned tax delinquent properties. Several
state legislatures have identified such problems as they have reformed their tax
foreclosure laws:
The General Assembly finds thatthe nonpayment ofad valorem taxes by property
owners effectively shifts a greater tax burden to property owners willing and able
to pay their share of taxes, that the failure to pay ad valorem taxes creates a
significant barrier to neighborhood and urban revitalization, that significant tax
delinquency creates barriers to marketability of the property, and that nonjudicial
foreclosure procedures are inefficient, lengthy, and commonly result in title to real
property which is neither marketable nor insurable. In addition, the General
Assembly finds thattax delinquency in many instances results in properties which
present health and safety hazards to the public. 11
Abandonment of properties in the face of rising property taxes is a major problem
in urban areas." At times this may represent a conscious decision on the part of an
owner of investment property to "milk the equity" from the property simply by
inflating cash flow returns while ignoring the accruing property liability. In other
contexts it may reflect the inability or unwillingness of a property owner to pay
property taxes based upon what it perceives to be a grossly inaccurate assessed value.
In either context, the greater the amount of accrued delinquent taxes relative to fair
market value, the greater the disincentive for the property owner to make payment of
the taxes.4" When the total amount of accrued taxes, penalties, and interest equals or
exceeds the fair market value of the property, no owner or third party will pay the
taxes or make any investment in the property.46 Compounding the problem, the local
government will not be able to find any purchaser at a tax foreclosure sale when the
minimum bid for such a purchase is the total amount of the delinquent tax liability.
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-75 (1998); see also W. VA. CODE § 1 IA-3-1 (1995).
[IT]he Legislature declares that its purposes in the enactment of this article are as
follows: (1) To provide for the speedy and expeditious enforcement of the tax claims
of the state and its subdivisions; (2) to provide for the transfer of delinquent and
nonentered lands to those more responsible to, or better able to bear, the duties of
citizenship than were the former owners ....
Id.
44. See George E. Peterson, The Property Tax and Low-Income Housing Markets, in
PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 17, at 107, 117-21.
45. See George Sternlieb & Robert W. Burchell, Residential Tax Delinquency: A
Forerunner to ResidentialAbandonment, 1 REAL EST. L.J. 256 (1973).
46. One approach that has been developed to address the problems posed by abandoned tax
delinquent properties, where taxes exceed fair market value, is the creation of a public land
bank authority to acquire such properties and convert them to public use, or transfer the
properties to third party entities for development activities in furtherance of public purposes.
See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-4-60 to -64 (1998); Frank S. Alexander, Property Tax Foreclosure
Reform: A Tale of Two Stories, GA. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 10, 10-11.
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Abandoned properties can quickly become public nuisances, foster crime, and cause
decline in neighboring property values.
B. The Collection of Delinquent Property Taxes
The collection of taxes has never been a pleasant task, but somebody has had to do
it. Throughout much of history the task has been accomplished by selling the right
to collect the taxes to a private third party-the tax collector as a private individual
acting to collect his (and the government's) due. The Ptolemaic Egyptians and ancient
Greeks both conducted auctions of the right to collect taxes due, providing the
governments with a definite amount of revenues in the face of uncertain and
unpredictable yields.47 The Roman Empire raised this to a fine art, auctioning the
right to collect taxes for five year periods of time.48 The successful bidder was
required to pay its bid in cash, though it could make such payments in installments.49
This "tax farming" during the Roman Empire was the basis for the creation of the
societas, partnerships formed solely for the purpose of advancing the government its
revenues by purchasing the tax collection rights."0 This had the added advantage of
recognizing a legal entity possessing the right to collect the taxes, without increasing
the size of a government bureaucracy.5' These tax collectors, the publicani, found
ways of increasing the yields on their investments by adding charges or increasing the
estimate of the size of the agricultural crops.52 In the face of wide resentment of the
publicani, whose primary motivation was to manipulate the tax system for their
private gain, Caesar Augustus reformed the tax system by shifting primarily to a fixed
rate property tax and poll tax.53
Financing of government operations by the sale, or lease, of the right to collect
taxes continued as a centerpiece of English legal and financial history. It was the
dominant method of raising revenues, through Italian banking syndicates, in the
thirteenth century54 and the primary procedure for collection of the cloth tax in the
fourteenth century. 5 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tax farming went
47. See A.H.M. JONES, THE ROMAN ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ANCIENT ECONOMIC AND
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 153-56 (P.A. Brunt ed., 1974). The basic tax during this early
Roman period was an agricultural tithe, based on the final crop yield. See E. BADIAN,
PUBLICANS AND SINNERS: PRIVATE ENTERPRISEINTHE SERVICE OFTHE ROMAN REPUBLIC 16,
81(1972).
48. See JOHNR. LOVE, ANTIQUITYAND CAPITALISM: MAX WEBERANDTHE SOCIOLOGICAL
FOUNDATION OF ROMAN CIVILIZATION 175-79 (1991).
49. See T. FRANK, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROME TO THE END OF THE REPUBLIC 139
(1970).
50. See P.A. BRUNT, SOCIAL CONFLICTS INTHE ROMAN REPUBLIC 22, 370-72 (1971).
51. See P.A. BRUNT, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC AND RELATED ESSAYS 164
(1988).
52. See BADIAN, supra note 47, at 81; JONES, supra note 47, at 118.
53. See JONES, supra note 47, at 81; LOVE, supra note 48, at 186.
54. See RICHARD W. KAEUPER, BANKERS TO THE CROWN: THE RICCARDI OF LUCCA AND
EDWARD I 79-81, 150-51 (1973).
55. See G.L. HARRIS, KING, PARLIAMENT, AND PUBLIC FINANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
TO 1369, at 458-59 (1975).
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through regular cycles of heavy usage, followed by abolition in the face of public
outcry. After a period of direct governmental collection of taxes resulted in
disappointing receipts, the government of Queen Elizabeth I returned to reliance on
private collections by farming the right of collection. 6 The "Great Farm of the
Customs" in 160457 marked a major commitment to tax farming, partially in order to
deal with rising government debts." During this period of time there were three
primary reasons for the government's reliance on the private collection of taxes. First,
the sale or lease of the right to collect the taxes provided a certain and predictable
income stream for government operations. 9 Second, it was felt that private collectors,
motivated by the desire to maximize their own rates of return, would be more
"energetic, efficient, and economical than salaried administrators."'6 Third, the very
presence of a tax farm gave rise to the possibility of government borrowing against
the value of the lease of tax receivables-deficit financing in its embryonic stage.
61
These advantages to tax farming, from the government's perspective, ran into direct
opposition from those who had to pay the tax. The tax farmers were motivated to
maximize their profit-a role at odds with public administration ofthe tax. Taxpayers
objected to the loss of public accountability for the levying and enforcement of the
taxes. Opposition to tax farming became a rallying cry for the English Revolution.62
The concept of using private entities to collect governmental taxes carried over to
the United States, both during the colonial period 63 and after nineteenth-century
industrialization, but in a much more limited fashion. Throughout the nineteenth
century the responsibility for property tax collections was placed either on the sheriff
or on the local government treasurer.' It was also common to select, in a temporary
capacity, a town collector to perform these duties.65 Until the expansion of
governmental administrative structures had reached a critical mass, these collectors
usually were not salaried employees, but rather were compensated on a commission
basis. Collectors were paid, for example, a commission of "one percent for current
collections, five percent for collection of delinquent taxes, and two percent for taxes
not collected!"' Local governments frequently relied upon private individuals, known
56. See MICHAEL J. BRADDICK, THE NERVES OF STATE: TAXATION AND THE FINANCING
OF THE ENGLISH STATE 1558-1714, at 36 (1996).
57. ROBERT ASHTON, THE CROWN AND THE MONEY MARKEr 1603-1640, at 79-105
(1960).
58. See FREDERICK C. DIETz, ENGLISH PuBLIC FINANCE 1558-1641, at 328-32 (1932).
59. See BRADDICK, supra note 56, at 36.
60. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 158 (2d ed.
1993); see also ASHTON, supra note 57, at 80-81; DIETZ, supra note 58, at 119.
61. See ASHTON, supra note 57, at 87; BRADDICK, supra note 56, at 37; DIET, supra note
58, at 343.
62. See BRADDICK, supra note 17, at 197-201.
63. See FREDERICK ROBERTSON JONES, HISTORY OF TAXATION IN CONNECTICUT 1636-
1776, at 15 (1896).
64. See JENSEN, supra note 17, at 309-10.
65. See STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF PROPERTY 71 (National Industrial Conference
Board, Inc., 1930) [hereinafter Industrial Conference Board].
66. IM at 71 ("Such a system of remuneration is absurd. It results in high collection costs
and sometimes in unnecessary delinquency. New York assessors have been known to place
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as "tax ferrets," or "tax inquisitors," to identify property for which no taxes were
being paid.67 This variation oftax fanning, however, was routinely condemned,68 and
has largely been abandoned in the context of contemporary property tax collection
procedures. 6
9
The collection of delinquent property taxes today does contain one key feature
which draws from the historical use of tax farming. Once the taxes have been
declared delinquent, most jurisdictions in the United States permit a private third
party to purchase the local government's lien for the taxes due. This transfer of the
lien. is distinct from the sale of the underlying property which occurs at a tax
foreclosure sale. Instead, what is transferred is the lien itself, vesting in the purchaser
the right to enforce the lien in accordance with statutory procedures.
The transferability of property tax liens to private third parties is not new.7" What
is new is that local governments, within the past few years, have begun to view their
delinquent tax digests as potential assets rather than administrative burdens. There are
three reasons why a delinquent tax lien may be attractive to a third party purchaser,
or investor, in today's market. The first is that in all jurisdictions the property tax lien
is accorded the status of being the first lien in priority of claims against the property.7'
This permits the holder of the lien to enforce the lien and receive payment prior to
payment of any and all other claims against the property, including all mortgages.
The second is that delinquent taxes carry substantial penalties and rates of interest,
all of which accrue to the benefit of the investor from the date of its purchase of the
lien. 2 This could provide rates of return from a minimum of 12% to more than 40%.' 3
The third reason for renewed attention to delinquent tax digests is that local
governments are increasingly being granted authority to enter into negotiated bulk
sale transactions, in which large volumes of a delinquent tax digest are transferred to
an investor, frequently at a discount from the face value of the liens. Purchasing the
liens at a discount simply increases flirther the effective yield received by the investor
when the face amount of the accrued taxes, interest, penalties and costs are paid upon
obstacles in the way of prompt payment of taxes.").
67. JENSEN, supra note 17, at 354-55.
68. See E.A. Angell, The Tax Inquisitor System in Ohio, 5 YALE L.J. 350, 369 (1897).
69. "Farming out tax administration is an ancient expedient; the experience seems to
demonstrate that the ethics of tax administration cannot be maintained except by public
officials under oath to follow the law." Harold M. Groves, Is the Property Tax Conceptually
andPracticallyAdministrable?, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note
15, at 15, 21 (citing JOHN E. BRINDLEY, HISTORY OF TAXATION IN IOWA (1911)).
70. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19 (1 998). This right ofprivate third parties to acquire
tax executions from the government was authorized by the first legislative session of the
Georgia General Assembly following the end ofmilitary rule. 1872 Ga. Laws 75. Prior to 1872
the transfer of tax executions in Georgia was not permitted. See Smith v. Mason, 48 Ga. 177
(1872).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
73. See infra text accompanying note 154.
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redemption or foreclosure sale. A variation on a bulk sale of delinquent tax liens is
the securitization of the delinquent tax digest that is accomplished by selling the liens
to a special purpose trust which then issues bonds to investors.74
The first large scale securitization of a delinquent property tax digest occurred in
1993, when Jersey City, New Jersey, transferred approximately $44 million in
delinquent tax liens. 5 Since that initial transaction, Jersey City completed a second
transaction in 1994, and other jurisdictions have quickly followed. These include
New Haven ($23 million, 1995),16 Fulton County/City of Atlanta ($30 million,
1995)," New York City ($250 million, 1996),"' Washington, D.C. ($50 million,
1996),"9 Philadelphia ($106 million, 1997),o Puerto Rico ($400 million, 1998),81 and
hundreds of other local governments are actively considering such sales.8 2 By 1998,
over $1.5 billion in tax lien securitizations had been completed or were in process . 3
This conversion of tax lien receivables into instant funds for local governments has
not been limited to large cities, as Arlington, Virginia 4 and Marlborough,
Massachusetts85 both have undertaken such transactions. 6
Because of the wide diversity in the types of tax lien foreclosure procedures, it is
difficult to ascertain precisely how many states, or local governments, permit large
74. There are comparative advantages and disadvantages between a negotiated bulk sale
of liens, and the securitization of tax liens, though such differences may well be a matter of the
applicable state law. See generally Georgette C. Poindexter et al., Selling Municipal Property
Tax Receivables: Economics, Privatization, and Public Policy in an Era of Urban Distress,
30 CONN. L. REv. 157 (1997).
75. See id. at 191; Patricia Tigue, Tax Lien Securitization: Putting Nonperforming Assets
to Work, GOV'T FIN. Rv. June 1996, at 33. See generally Michael G. Pelligrino & Ralph P.
Allocca, Tax Certificates: A Review ofthe Tax Sale Law, 26 SETON HALLL. REV. 1607 (1996)
(reviewing New Jersey tax sale law).
76. See Poindexter et al., supra note 74, at 186; Tigue, supra note 75, at 34.
77. See Joseph T. Whelihan, The Advantages of Tax Lien Privatization, NATION'S CITIES
WKLY., Oct. 28, 1996, at 5, 5.
78. See Alvin L. Arnold, New York Makes Largest Tax Lien Offering, MORTGAGE & REAL
EST. ExEcuTivE's REP., Sept. 15, 1996.
79. See Jay Sherman, Washington, D.C. Readies the Latest Tax Lien Deal, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIGEsT, July 22, 1996, at 12.
80. See Ben Hayllar, Philadelphia's Tax Lien Sale and Securitization, GOv'T FIN. REv.,
Dec. 1997, at 17,18. The Government Finance Officers Association has adopted a set ofpolicy
recommendations for the sale and securitization of tax liens. See id. at 19.
81. See Puerto Rico To Securitize $400 Million in Tax Liens, BOND BUYER, Apr. 15, 1998,
at 1.
82. See Patricia Tigue et al., GFOAIMBIA 1997 Survey on Revenue Collection Practices
in State and Local Governments, GOV'T FIN. REv., Aug. 1997, at 13, 13-14.
83. See Ted Cornwell, Tax Lien Servicing Joint Venture Receives Approval From S&P,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 7, 1998, at 22.
84. See ia
85. See David Kaplan, Malborough, Mass. Is First in State To Have Successful Bulk Lien
Sale, BOND BUYER, July 17, 1998, at 28.
86. One estimate of the total amount of property tax delinquencies nationally is $60 billion,
leaving perhaps $5-7 billion available for securitization at any one time. See Breen Welcomes
the Big Boys into Tax-Lien Market, ASSET SALES REP., Nov. 25, 1996, at 1, 1.
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scale transfers of tax liens to private sector investors through bulk sales."7 A number
of jurisdictions do have express statutory authority for negotiated transactions.8
Otherjurisdictions conduct public auctions oftax liens at which private investors may
participate. 9 In many jurisdictions, the public "sale" is more accurately a sale of the
underlying property in which a certificate is issued entitling the purchaser to a deed
to the property if the taxes are not redeemed.'
This "privatization of collection of delinquent real estate taxes"'" is justified on the
same grounds upon which tax farming was justified for thousands of years. It
provides an immediate, and reliable, source of revenues as against an otherwise
unpredictable rate of return over time.' It allows the private market to function,
presumably more efficiently, in collecting the revenues. It increases the ability of the
local governments to borrow against existing tax receivables.' The one key
difference between the current sale and securitization of tax liens, and historic tax
farming, is that tax farming involved the transfer, or sale, of the right to collectfiuture
taxes whereas the bulk sale of tax liens involves the transfer only of the right to
collect taxes which, by their terms, are already delinquent in payment.
87. Two separate sources indicate that 28 or 29 jurisdictions permit bulk sales or
securitizations of tax liens. See Whelihan, supra note 77, at 5 ("Twenty-nine states currently
permit the privatization of delinquent tax liens."); Elwood F. Collins, Jr. & Max Von Hollweg,
Tax Lien Securitization, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURrrIzATIoN 251,261-627 (Practising
Law Institute, 1996) (stating that approximately 28 states have statutes that permit counties to
sell accrued taxes in a public auction). Unfortunately, neither source provides a description of
the statutory authority, or procedure for the sale of such liens.
88. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-10-180(3) (Supp. 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-
18104(B) (West Supp. 1999); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 4511, 4528-4530 (West 1998);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-148(c)(2)(L), 12-195h (West Supp. 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §
47-1303.4 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19 (1999); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. §§ 211.921-
.941 (West Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-113 (West Supp. 1999); N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW § 1042 (McKinney Supp. 1999); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5721.33 (Anderson
1999); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7147 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-73 (Supp.
1998); see also N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00(36), (37) (McKinney 1968) (granting authority
to finance expenditures related to enforcement of ad valorem tax liens).
89. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-11-108, -131 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 197.432 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134.430(4), .450
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 2C(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999);
MONT. CODEANN. § 15-17-212 (1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80:80(II-a) (Supp. 1999); W.
VA. CODE § 1 IA-3-2 (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-108(e)(ii)(A)-(e)(iii) (Michie 1999).
90. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-260(a)-(t (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); IND.
CODEANN. § 6-1.1-24-9 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); IOWA CODEANN. § 446.9 (West 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-817 (1994 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODEANN. § 15-17-212
(1999); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 77-1806 to -1818 (1996).
91. Poindexter et al., supra note 74, at 157.
92. "There are four basic statutory provisions authorizing sale or assignment ofmunicipally
held tax sales certificates. All of these provisions are designed to convert tax sales certificates
into usable cash without necessity of the municipality first proceeding to bar or foreclose the
right of redemption." Dvorkin v. Dover Tp., 148 A.2d 793, 796 (N.J. 1959).
93. See Poindexter et al., supra note 74, at 159-62, 185-89.
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The recent trend toward the securitization of property tax liens raises a number of
broader public policy concerns imbedded in the willingness ofa govermnentto utilize
private actors to implement its policies. Questions are raised as to whether the
properties which are subject to delinquent tax lien enforcement may adversely affect
particular groups of property owners, such as low income and elderly owners. 4 The
transfer of tax liens to a third party purchaser may reduce, or eliminate, the
availability ofpublic tax forgiveness programs and favorable tax repaymentprograms
designed to ameliorate the tax burdens on classes of disadvantaged owners. It is also
possible that the sale of delinquent tax liens to private third parties effectively shields
the government from political pressures associated with challenges to the accuracy
of the assessment process, or the importance of various "circuit breaker" programs
such as homestead exemptions. 9 There is no assurance that the tax lien purchasers
themselves, if they ultimately acquire the property at a tax foreclosure, will pay
property taxes in subsequent years, or will adequately maintain the property. As was
characteristic of the public antipathy towards tax fanning generally, the interests of
the private investor in maximizing its return on investment are simply not the same
as the interest of public officials in the administration of government. 96
One of most critical determinants in the willingness of a private investor to
purchase a property tax lien is the validity of the underlying security.97 While the
super-priority status of a property tax lien may be relatively assured,9 and it is
possible for a potential investor to make an informed judgment about the lien-to-
value ratio of a particular lien on a specific piece of property,99 a potential investor
in a large volume of property tax liens faces two fundamental challenges which
remain unresolved. The first concern is simply the wide diversity among jurisdictions
in their property tax lien foreclosure procedures. Efficiency, and economies of scale,
push towards the aggregation of liens of multiple cities, or states, but the absence of
any uniform approach makes this quite difficult. The second is the uncertainty created
by the application of the due process standards of Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams' to the tax lien foreclosure procedure.
94. See Hayllar, supra note 80, at 18-19.
95. Poindexter et al., supra note 74, at 184, 207-08.
96. The recommended practices adopted by the Government Finance Officers Association
emphasizes the need for the governmental entity to "[b]e clear about the public policy
objectives to be achieved" by the sale of tax liens, and its community relations impact. Hayllar,
supra note 80, at 19.
97. See Collins & Von Hollweg, supra note 87, at 264.
98. One of the potential uncertainties of the priority of a property tax lien is whether a
delinquency accruing in a subsequent year takes priority over the delinquency of a prior year.
While there is divergence among the states on this point, an investor can make a calculated
program decision on whether to pay subsequently accruing taxes, if indeed they take priority
over the lien which is purchased.
99. The lien-to-value ratio is the ratio determined by the aggregate indebtedness (taxes,
interest, penalties, and costs) secured by the lien, divided by the unencumbered fair market
value of the property.
100. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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The 1950 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. '0 represented a shift in due process jurisprudence which,
for present purposes, became fully manifest in Mennonite. A tax lien investor,
whether purchasing a single tax lien on a single tract of property, purchasing a large
volume of tax liens through a negotiated bulk sale, or investing in a securitized pool
of tax liens, faces the risk that compliance with applicable statutory procedures for
lien enforcement may simply not be enough to satisfy the due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The constitutional floor of notice requirements
created by Mennonite has received widely disparate judicial treatment, leaving at
times far more questions than answers.
C. The Evolving Requirements ofDue Process
By the end of the nineteenth century, judicial jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a dispute could be accomplished in two ways that satisfied the due process
requirements of the United States Constitution: the parties to the dispute could be
reached by personal service within the territorial limits of the state, or the subject
matter of the dispute was physically located within the state.0 3 In the first context, in
personam jurisdiction, due process jurisprudence had to face the challenge of
establishing necessary and sufficient criteria by which jurisdiction could be obtained
over a defendant with minimal contacts with the jurisdiction. Concerns over the
fairness of the expansion ofjurisdiction led to increased emphasis on the adequacy
of notice to parties who could not be physically served within the territorial limits. In
the second context, in rem jurisdiction, the presence of the subject matter within the
territorial limits of the judiciary led to less reliance on the adequacy of notice as an
essential element of the process due under the constitution. A judgment in an in rem
101. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
102. This assumes that the enforcement of property tax liens by private third parties
constitutes state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though it is beyond the
scope of this Article to explore in depth the boundaries of state action doctrine which are tested
by the movement towards privatization of governmental functions, the essential elements as
established by the United States Supreme Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Services., Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), appear to be present. A governmental entity which defines the
terms and conditions for property tax lien enforcement, and then enters into a transaction with
a private third party transferring the government's enforcement rights to such party, invokes
"involvement [which] is so pervasive and substantial that it must be considered state action
subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 487. "In
structuring the sale of the liens, the city can contractually obligate the purchaser to act with the
same legal duties to the taxpayer that the city would have. In fact, this contractual obligation
should be a non-negotiable element of the transaction." Poindexter et al., supra note 74, at 206.
A related question is whether a private third party that has purchased a governmental property
tax lien is subject to the possibility of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) if its actions
fall to meet the constitutional due process requirements. See Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, Inc.,
998 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1998) (denying summary judgment on the grounds that a more
thorough factual development is needed to determine whethertax lien purchaser's involvement
constituted state action).
103. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1877).
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proceeding is limited to the defendant's interest in the property. 4 Notice by
publication could suffice in an in rem action, while it would rarely be sufficient in an
in personam proceeding.
In four decisions at the turn of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme
Court sustained the adequacy of notice by publication in proceedings to enforce
delinquent property taxes. 05 Three overlapping justifications were given for this
conclusion. The first rationale is that an in rem proceeding, which creates no personal
liability, requires less notice to owners in order to meet the fairness standard of due
process."0 6 A state must, of necessity, be able to resolve title to property within its
jurisdiction. The second rationale is the "caretaker" principle, a premise that each
property owner knows, or should know, of obligations related to the fact of its
ownership and is responsible to meet those obligations.0" The third rationale derives
from the special nature of taxation. The imposition of ad valorem taxes and
assessments does not require personal service to the property owner, and so long as
some opportunity is given for the owner to contest the accuracy of the tax, no further
notice obligation exists upon enforcement of procedures for nonpayment ofthe tax. 08
104. Constitutionally inadequate inpersonamjurisdiction cannot be the basis for subsequent
enforcement of a resulting judgment in an in rem proceeding. See id. The classic in rem
proceeding adjudicates the rights and claims of all parties to specific property. Due process
jurisprudence further refined in rem jurisdiction into two additional categories of quasi in rem
jurisdiction: one where a claimant seeks to establish an interest in real property, and a second
where a claimant seeks to satisfy a claim, unrelated to title to the property, by attachment, levy,
or seizure of the property. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
105. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414,418 (1907); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241,
261-62 (1906); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 93 (1904); Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v.
Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1895).
106. See Leigh, 193 U.S. at 90, 92.
But it is to be remembered that the primary object of the [in rem] statute is to
reach the land which has been assessed .... "Looked at either from the point of
view of history or of the necessary requirements ofjustice, a proceeding in rem,
dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the state, or notice by name to those
outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution."
Id. at 90-92 (quoting Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of Massachusetts, in Tyler v. Judges
of the Court of Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 813 (Mass. 1900)). A proceeding to enforce a lien
for delinquent ad valorem taxes usually is a classic in rem proceeding, affecting all other
interests in the property, precisely because thetax lien is accorded a"super-priority" status. See
infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
107. See Longyear, 209 U.S. at 418 ("The owner of property whose taxes, duly assessed,
have remained unpaid for more than one year must be held to the knowledge that proceedings
for sale are liable to be begun .... "); Ballard, 204 U.S. at 254 ("The land stands accountable
to the demands of the state, and the owners are charged with the laws affecting it and the
manner by which those demands may be enforced.").
108. See Leigh, 193 U.S. at 89 ("'The process of taxation does not require the same kind of
notice as is required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking private property under
the power of eminent domain."' (quoting Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232,
239 (1890))); Winona, 159 U.S. at 537-38 (holding that there is no due process violation "if
the owner has an opportunity to question the validity or the amount of [the tax] either before
that amount is determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection").
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During the first half of the twentieth century local government officials moved to
embrace the possibility of in rem proceedings, with notice by publication, as the
optimum method of collecting property taxes. In the face of massive tax
delinquencies spawned by the Great Depression, the National Municipal League
adopted in 1935 "A Model Real Property Tax Collection Law."'" This Model Law
proposed a two stage process in which the property is first sold in a nonjudicial
proceeding, followed by a statutory right of redemption. A minimum one year right
of redemption exists until foreclosed by the purchaser at the initial sale. At both
stages, notice to interested parties is provided by publication, with additional notice
mailed to the owner at the time of the initial sale if the owner's identity is known.
This Model Law was republished in a second edition in 1954, in which the economic
efficiency and constitutional soundness of the procedures were emphasized."'
At the very time, however, that state and local governments were moving to
implement tax foreclosure procedures based upon the "real innovation""' of the in
rem procedure of the Model Law, the due process jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court was moving in the opposite direction. Jurisdiction over a dispute requires not
just jurisdiction over the persons or the property,* but also adequate notice to the
parties in order that they will have an opportunity to be heard. While property tax
officials assumed that physical jurisdiction was a sufficient condition for proceeding
summarily, the Supreme Court clarified that notice to interested parties is an
independent, and necessary, condition of due process. In its 1950 decision in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.," the Supreme Court held that the distinction
between inpersonam and in rem jurisdiction is not a basis for differences in the duty
to provide notice of the proceeding to interested parties."' At the core of any
proceeding is the requirement that there is "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. ' 4 At issue was the adequacy of
notice by publication. While the Court recognized that notice by publication alone
may be sufficient "where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more
adequate warning,""' the Court held that publication alone does not meet the
requirements of due process when the identities and addresses of interested parties are
known." 6
109. Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 182 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1944) (en banc) (sustaining Missouri Land
Tax Collection Act against constitutional challenges); National Municipal League, A Model
Real Property Tax Collection Law, 24 NAT'L MUN. REv. 289 (1935).
110. See NATIONAL MUNiCIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL REAL PROPERTY TAX COLLECTIoN LAW
at xi-xvi (2d ed. 1954). "The effect of the action is to vest title in fee in the foreclosing tax
district. Under the action in rem no tax title searches are required; no summons and complaint
need be served personally; there are no referees' fees or filing fees. The action is simple,
summary and inexpensive." George Xanthaky, Improvements in Foreclosure Procedure, in
PROPERTY TAXES, supra note 9, at 262, 265-66.
111. National Municipal League, supra note 109, at xii.
112. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
113. See id. at 312-13.
114. Id. at 314.
115. Id. at 317.
116. The Court doubted that notice by publication would usually provide sufficient notice:
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The Mullane decision had a profound impact on the statutory procedures for
collecting delinquent property taxes. It cast into doubt the constitutional adequacy of
the tax foreclosure procedures which had been recommended and adopted in many
jurisdictions. It created a flexible standard of reasonableness in which the adequacy
of notice provisions is dependent on a number of variables. While it expressly
rejected one of the three rationales at the basis of its early twentieth century opinions,
the distinction between inpersonam and in rem jurisdiction, it left open the viability
of the two other rationales, the "caretaker" proposition and the unique nature of tax
policies, in justifying different treatment of property tax foreclosure procedures.
Mullane did not establish a clear set of requirements for the notice that must be
given in order to meet the requirements of due process. It suggested that the adequacy
of any given notice will depend on the nature of the legal proceedings, the due
diligence necessary to identify the interested parties and their addresses, the costs
associated with such identification, and whether the notice is likely to reach and
inform the interested parties of the proceeding. It was clear that more than notice by
publication was required when the identity and address of the owner were readily
available," 7 yet it was anything but clear whether tax officials must conduct full tite
examinations, or examine other public records, in order to identify the interested
parties. In the context of an eminent domain proceeding, the Supreme Court held, in
1956, that such a title examination was not an undue burden so as to outweigh the due
process protections of notice."'
Between the 1950 decision in Mullane and the 1983 decision in Mennonite, courts
throughout the country wrestled with the due process requirements applicable to tax
foreclosure proceedings and reached little consensus. Most held that notice by
publication alone was inadequate when mailed notice could easily be provided to
owners and other interested parties," 9 but little consensus emerged on what steps
Notice by publication cannot simply bear the normative weight expected of it.
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in
small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the
information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is
further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those
whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who
might call it to attention.
Id. at 315.
117. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S 141, 146-47 (1956) (holding even mailed
notice is insufficient when the government is aware of the incompetency of the property
owner); Note, Requirements ofNotice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257 (1957).
This note anticipated both the subsequent Mennonite opinion and the difficulties posed by the
uncertainty of a "reasonableness" standard. Id. at 1268-71. "Even though the existence of
property within a state will ordinarily furnish the minimum contact prerequisite to the assertion
ofjurisdiction, the issue of adequate notice is more likely to depend on the reasonableness of
the notice and the availability of a fair opportunity to be heard than on the rigid formulas relied
on in the past." Id. at 1264; see also Jonnathoan W. Still, The Constitutionality of Notice by
Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings, 84 YALE L.J. 1505 (1975).
118. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); see also Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962).
119. See Laz v. Southwestem Land Co., 397 P.2d 52, 56 (Ariz. 1964); Sedgwick County
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must be taken by local governments to identify and contact the parties who may have
an interest in the property.
Mennonite Board ofMissions v. Adams' made clear, in the context of property tax
foreclosure proceedings, what Mullane had foreshadowed. When the identity and
address of a party having an interest in real property are readily available from public
records, notice by publication alone is insufficient-mailed notice at a minimum is
reqtfired. In Mennonite a lender, whose mortgage was recorded in the public records,
challenged the adequacy of the property tax foreclosure proceedings, conducted in
accordance with Indiana law, which required only notice by publication to all parties
other than the owner of record. The lender was not given notice by mail of either the
original tax sale of the property or of the end of the redemption period. Applying the
Mullane analysis, the Court held: "Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure
actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or
well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably
ascertainable.''
Mennonite built upon Mullane and resolved any lingering doubts on three issues.
First, the standards of notice applicable to in personam jurisdiction are equally
appropriate in in rem jurisdiction." Second, mortgagees, as holders of legally
protected property interests, are entitled to the protections of due process just as much
as owners. Third, names and addresses available from the deed records must be used
to provide notice to interested parties. The due process standard for property tax
foreclosures became "notice reasonably calculated" to inform those parties who hold
"legally protected property interests" whose names and addresses are "reasonably
ascertainable" by "reasonably diligent efforts."
Given the wide range of existing property tax foreclosure procedures across the
United States, however, the tightening of due process standards in Mennonite has
raised far more questions than it resolved. Mostjurisdictions continue to utilize a two-
step procedure in which there is an initial sale of the property, or the tax lien,
followed by a fixed redemption period that is terminated by a second proceeding. It
is not clear whether due process requires notice of each of these proceedings, or
whether the provision of adequate notice at one stage alone is sufficient. Though a
mortgagee holds a "legally protected interest" and is entitled to the requisite notice,
there is no consensus on whether such notice obligation also extends to concurrent
owners, holders of subordinate judgment liens, occupants of the property, holders of
easements and covenants, and other potentially interested parties. A full title
examination, in accordance with title insurance standards, would reveal most ofthese
interests, but not all jurisdictions today require such a title search as part of a tax
Comm'rs v. Fugate, 499 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Kan. 1972); Dow v. State, 240 N.W.2d 450, 458
(Mich. 1976); Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 376 A.2d 909,916 (N.J. 1977); see
also Kristin E. Earls, Due Process in Tax Sales in New York: The Insufficiency of Notice by
Publication, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 769, 783-84 (1974).
120. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
121. Id. at 800 (emphasis in original).
122. See id. at 796 n.3.
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foreclosure, and there is no consensus on what constitutes reasonably diligent efforts
to locate interested parties.
In establishing a standard of reasonableness for notification to interested parties,
the Supreme Court also left open the continuing relevancy of two justifications put
forth earlier in this century. In the spirit of the "caretaker" premise which imposes
ongoing responsibilities on property owners to be aware of their governmental
obligations, many jurisdictions responded to Mennonite by enactment of "request-
notice" statutes which permit any interested party to file a request for notice of tax
proceedings. This question, expressly unresolved by Mennonite,"n leaves uncertainty
across the country. In determining the reasonableness of notice and identification of
parties, the fact that this is a tax procedure continues to be injected into the balancing
equation. As argued by the dissent in Mennonite, state and local governments have
a vital interest in the collection of taxes, and in avoiding expensive burdens of
foreclosure proceedings. 4 This has led some courts to emphasize the importance to
local governments of securing the prompt and efficient payment of taxes,15 while
others have concluded that efficiency is fully subordinate to due process. 26 Mullane
and Mennonite provide for a balancing of interests to achieve a reasonable result. 7
In the years since Mennonite, state and local governments have struggled to
develop constitutionally adequate procedures for the enforcement of property tax
collections, but many statutes still fall short of the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Property tax revenues continue to be a vital part of the health of local
governments, and the inability to collect such taxes imposes significant financial and
cultural costs. The recent rise in the bulk sale and securitization of property tax liens
must confront directly the uncertainty of the underlying security in the face of
constitutional questions.
123. Id at 793 n.2.
124. Id at 806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. See Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 612, 618-19 (D. Md. 1998).
Requiring a local tax collector or a tax sale purchaser to identify holders of
unrecorded interests at the early stages of the process would be extraordinarily
burdensome, and would very likely discourage prospective purchasers from
participating in tax sales. If this were to happen, the state's significant interest in
combating abandonment of properties, especially in urban areas, and in securing
for its citizens the revenue necessary to carry out important governmental
functions, would be frustrated.
Id.
126. "Moreover, the interests of efficient revenue collection and secure tax titles, although
legitimate, do not have the same high order of importance under our legal system as the
prevention of forfeitures of private property without prior notice." Register v. Kenai Peninsula
Borough, 667 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1983); see also Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio, 878
F.2d 883,892 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[E]fficiency is not the standard-bearer of due process. Indeed,
efficient governance and due process struggle in an inherently tense relationship.").
127. See Tulsa Prof'I Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,484-85 (1988); see also
FDIC v. Lee, 933 F. Supp. 577, 580 (D. La. 1996) ("The notice requirement is tempered by
the notion of reasonableness. The pertinent inquiry is whether a state actor could through
reasonable diligence discover the interest of the party and then attempt notification.")
(emphasis in original).
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III. THE VARious FORMS OF PROPERTY TAX ENFORCEMENT
If all jurisdictions in the United States had a common approach to enforcement of
property tax liens, or at least had a common theory as to what occurs at the initial tax
sale, reform of procedures in light of evolving Supreme Courtjurisprudence would
be challenging but not overwhelming. Instead, no two states have the same
procedures, many states have more than one possible procedure which can be
utilized, and a significant number of states with strong home-rule provisions permit
cities and counties to adopt their own independent provisions. Application of a due
process balancing test of reasonableness in particular circumstances yields a
seemingly infinite range of conclusions on the permutations of the property tax
foreclosure procedures. Many of these existing procedures fail to meet constitutional
minimum standards, and many more are likely to fail as clarity emerges in coming
years.
A. The Super-Priority Status of
the Property Tax Lien
In theory, at least, the property tax should be the simplest of all taxes to enforce. 2 1
Once there is a final and binding determination of the assessed value of the property,
and the taxes are imposed, all that remains is voluntary payment of the taxes, or
involuntary enforcement. The key to the simplicity (at least in theory) in the
enforcement of property taxes lies in the fact that in virtually every jurisdiction a lien
against the property arises by operation of law as of a date certain. In most
jurisdictions the lien arises as of a statutory date each year, with taxes due and
payable at a subsequent date following the issuance of the tax bill. Based solely upon
the importance of the power of taxation to the existence of the government, the
property tax lien is the first and senior lien against the property, senior even as to
mortgages and other liens arising prior in time and properly recorded earlier in time.
Most jurisdictions accord this "super-priority" status to property tax liens as a
matter of statute, 29 though otherjurisdictions have reached the same result as a matter
128. Professor Jensen observed in 1931:
It should be a relatively simple matter to collect the tax, once it has been extended
on the roll and a proper warrant has made it a legally collectible claim. On paper,
at least, the collector has adequate legal authority; the tax is usually prior to all
other claims; barring fraud and illegality in the, levy and assessment nothing
should stay the collection.
JENSEN, supra note 17, at 307.
129. See ALA. CODE § 40-1-3 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.300(b) (Michie 1998); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-17153(B)(3) (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-34-101(a) (Michie
1997); CAL. REV. &TAX. CODE § 2192.1 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-107(2)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-172 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, § 2901(a)(3) (Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1312(a-1) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 197.122(1) (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2-56, -5-28 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 246-55(a) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 63-1003(2) (1996); 35 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-75 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-22-13(c)
(Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1804 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.420(1)
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of judicial decision. 30 However, the relative priority of a lien for a specific year's
taxes, as against prior or subsequent years, does not receive consistent treatment.
Similarly, questions always exist with respect to the relative priority of the liens as
among different governmental units within a state. Liens for special assessments are
commonly treated different than property tax liens for purposes of due process
analysis.'3 '
B. The Range of Approaches
The multiplicity of different approaches to the enforcement of property tax liens
exceeds that of virtually any other aspect of state and local government law. Part of
this is attributable to the origins of the property tax as one upon personal property
(both tangible and intangible) as well as real property,'3 7 giving rise to personal
liability of the property owner, and the gradual evolution towards a real property tax
only, with a focus on in rem procedures. It is also due to the fact that while in most
states one or more procedures are authorized for statewide use, in some jurisdictions
the procedures for enforcement of property tax liens differ according to the nature of
the local government,' or are largely within the authority of local
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:2183 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 552 (West 1990); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-805(a) (1994);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 37 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-35-1 (1995
& Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-203, -208 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.450
(Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-9 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-48 (Michie
1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-356(a) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-40(1) (1993); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5721.10 (Anderson 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 311.405(7)(a) (1993 & Supp.
1998); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7102-7103 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-1(b) (1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-2101(a) (1998);
TEX. TAX CODEANN. § 32.05 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1325 (1996); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 5061 (1994 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODEANN. § 58.1-3340 (Michie 1997); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 84.60.010 (West 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 70.01 (West 1999); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 39-13-108(d)(ii) (Michie 1999); 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, § 60(4).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Christensen, 218 F. Supp. 722,729 (D. Mont. 1963) (holding
that liens for ad valorem taxes have priority over private mortgages); Barker's Inc. v. B.D.J.
Dev. Co., 308 N.W.2d 78, 83 (Iowa 1981) (interpreting IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 445.28-.32 to
create super-priority status); Granite Bituminous Paving Co. v. Parkview Realty &
Improvement Co., 201 S.W. 933, 934-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a special tax bill
has first priority over a prior deed of trust); First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 639 A.2d
1089, 1092 (N.H. 1994) (holding that superior rank of tax lien over abank mortgage is implied
by statute and established by case law).
131. See, e.g., Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 624 (11th Cir. 1995) ("The
imposition of the special assessments and their lien prioritization do not immediately and
drastically diminish his interests in a manner that would implicate a Mennonite due process
deprivation."); FDIC v. City ofNew Iberia, 921 F.2d 610, 614-16 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
aspecial assessment, with super-priority, does not violate mortgagee's due process rights when
it is established without notice to the mortgagee).
132. See JENSEN, supra note 17, at 48-99.
133. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-117-427 (Michie 1998) (creating a separate procedure for
improvement districts); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8721, 8742, 8771 (1989 & Supp. 1998)
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governments.' Added to this is the tendency of states, when presented with new
foreclosure procedures, simply to add the new procedures as optional ones for use by
local governments.'35
While all jurisdictions recognize a lien for property taxes, and all provide some
mechanism for enforcement of that lien, the similarities end at that point. A small
minority of jurisdictions functionally recognize a form of "strict foreclosure"'36 in
which a final date is established for payment of the taxes, and upon nonpayment the
property is conveyed to the government. 3 7 In these jurisdictions, the levy of the
property tax lien does not involve a public or private sale. In the overwhelming
majority ofjurisdictions enforcement of the property tax lien involves a sale of the
lien itself, or of the underlying property, or sequential sales of first the lien and then
the property. Part of the confusion of what is being sold is likely attributable to the
decision of the authors of the 1935 Model Real Property Tax Collection Law to use
language of selling the property, while states nonetheless continued the practice of
selling liens. 3' Some states use the concept that, at a sale, a "certificate" is
transferred, but this, too, has inconsistent use. Some states use "certificate" as
(establishing different procedures for particular counties); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91.450
(Michie 1982 & Supp. 1998) (prescribing separate procedure for first class cities); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 21-33-57 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (creating separate procedures for municipalities); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 94.170, .320 (West 1998) (prescribing different procedures for different class
cities); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 1997) (creating separate procedures for first
class and second class cities).
134. See, e.g., MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. §§ 211.107, .108 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999),
amended by 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, §§ 107, 108 (procedures may be adopted by cities and
villages); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW §§ 1100-1138 (McKinney 1989) (statewide in rem
foreclosure statute except when authorized in local charters).
135. Some jurisdictions have completely rewritten the property tax foreclosure statutes in
recent years, partially in recognition of the disparity in approaches used within the state. See,
e.g., 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, 132, 133, 134; 1999 N.D. Laws 503; S.C. CODEANN. § 12-45-
180 (1976), repealed by 1993 S.C. Acts 100, § 1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
136. Strict foreclosure was the dominant method of foreclosing upon mortgages prior to the
late-seventeenth-century recognition ofthe"equity of redemption." In strict foreclosure, a date
certain is established for final payment of the debt, and upon passage of the date without
payment the property vests in the creditor. See FRANK S. ALEXANDER, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE
FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE LAW 4-8 (2d ed. 1994).
137. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.390(a) (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE § 63-1006(1) (1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 280.001 (West 1999); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 361.570(3) (Michie 1993
& Supp. 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80:76 (1991); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1136(3)
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-28-05 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§
312.050-. 100 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 75.14(1),.521(13)(b) (West 1999); 1999 Mich. Pub.
Acts 123, § 78k.
138. See National Municipal League, supra note 109, at 298 n.16 ("In a sense, perhaps, it
is the lien which is sold. It is desired, however, to use the language of property sales in order
to emphasize the fact that another sale is not required on foreclosure."). Other scholars
recognized that there is a fundamental distinction between a sale of the land, and a sale of the
lien. "The land itself is not being sold; rather the taxing unit's lien on the real estate for taxes
due the unit is being sold." HENRY W. LEWIS, PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION IN NORTH
CAROLINA 258 n.17 (1957) (emphasis in original).
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reflective of a sale of the property which entitles the certificate holder to a deed after
expiration of the redemption period.' In other states a certificate is simply a
certificate of delinquency, entitling the holder to proceed with a subsequent
foreclosure and sale of the property. 41 In those jurisdictions that enforce the property
tax lien through one public sale, the sale is a sale of the underlying property, though
the sale may be followed by a statutory right of redemption which requires
subsequent termination by the passage of time or by affirmative action by the
purchaser at the initial sale. Jurisdictions that recognize two separate sales are first
selling the lien, which is then enforced by a subsequent foreclosure sale.
Judicial involvement in the property tax lien enforcement process also varies
significantly across the country. Slightly less than half of the states permit
enforcement of the lien, and sale of the property, without any judicial process.'4 '
Roughly the same percentage have some form ofjudicial involvement, either at the
sale itself (ifthere is only one sale), or at the termination of the redemption period. 142
At least nine states presently permit the option of enforcing property tax liens through
either nonjudicial or judicial procedures. 4
139. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.502 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4 (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 446.29 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP.
§§ 14-820, -833 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1818 (1996).
140. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.450 (Michie Supp. 1998); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
5721.06 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1999).
141. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-37-101, -202 (Michie 1997); CAL. REV. &TAX. CODE §
3691 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-108 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 246-56 (Supp. 1998); IOWACODEANN. § 446.15 (West 1998); Miss. CODEANN.
§ 27-41-55 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-17-211 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.595
(Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:76 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-66 (Michie
1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-24-12 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3105 (West 1992);
S.C. CODEANN. § 12-51-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-23-
7 (Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1351 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 1 IA-3-5 (1995).
142. See ALA. CODE § 40-10-12 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.370 (Michie 1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-18201 (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8742 (1989 & Supp.
1998); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-75 (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.7(a)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.490 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-834 (1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 65 (Law. Co-op.
1990); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1123 (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
374 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.14 (Anderson 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 312.050
(1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-25 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-2405 (1998); TEx. TAX
CODE ANN. § 33.41 (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3967 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.64.080 (West 1991); 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, § 78h.
143. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-157 (nonjudicial) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999), 12-
181 (judicial) (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.502 (nonjudicial), 173.01 (judicial) (West
1987); GA. CODEANN. §§ 48-3-3(a) (nonjudicial), 4-76(a) (judicial) (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 79-2306(a) (nonjudicial) (1989), -2801 (judicial) (1989 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 140.190 (nonjudicial) (West 1998 & Supp. 1999), 141.040, .400 (judicial) (West 1998);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1806 (nonjudicial), -1902 (judicial) (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
30901 (nonjudicial), 7143 (judicial) (West 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5252
(nonjudicial), 5061 (b) (judicial) (1994); WIs. STAT. ANN. § § 75.12 (nonjudicial),. 19 (judicial)
(West 1999).
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The public sale of a tax lien, or sale of the property itself, is conducted in three
different ways across the country. The predominant approach is to offer the property
at public auction to the highest bidder, with a minimum bid equal to the aggregate
amount of delinquent taxes, interest, penalties and costs.1" If the sale price is in
excess of the minimum bid, the surplus is held for the benefit of subordinate
claimants and the original owner. A minority of jurisdictions conduct the public
auction by awarding the property to the purchaser willing to purchase the smallest
percentage undivided interest in the real property. 45 As a way of reflecting market
conditions and market interest rates, four states sell the property to the purchaser
offering the lowest effective rate of interest pending redemption of the property by
the owner. 14
6
C. Redemption Periods:
Interest and Penalties
Recognizing the severity of the consequences to the property owner from
enforcement of a property tax lien, the fact that the amount of delinquent property
taxes may commonly be a small percentage of the fair market value of the property,
and the difficulty a property owner may have in obtaining sufficient cash to pay the
necessary taxes, every jurisdiction in the country grants some period of time to the
owner to make the necessary payment even after the taxes are delinquent. This
extended period of time, once the taxes are declared delinquent, takes one of two
forms. The most common approach mirrors that followed by many states in the
enforcement of mortgages, which is to grant a statutory right of redemption for a
144. See ALA. CODE § 40-10-16 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-201 (Michie 1997); CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 3698.5(a) (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-115(2) (West
Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-157(c) (West Supp. 1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
1303(a) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-81(b) (1999); HAW. REv. STAT. § 246-55(d) (1993);
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-260(West 1996 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-
24-5(e) (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2804 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
426.200(1) (Michie 1992); MD. CODEANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-817(a)(2) (Supp. 1998); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 27-41-59 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-67(E) (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-374(k) (1997); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5723.06(A)(1) (Anderson 1999); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 27301, 27306 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-51-40(d) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1998);TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-2501 (a)(2) (1998); TEX. TAX CODEANN. § 34.01 (f)
(West Supp. 1999); UTAH CODEANN. § 59-2-1351.1(4) (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5254
(Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3967 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84.64.080 (West 1991); W. VA. CODE § I 1A-3-5(a) (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-
108(e) (Lexis 1999).
145. See IowA CODE ANN. § 446.16(1) (West 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:2184 (West
1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1074(West 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 43 (Law.
Co-op. 1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-1807 (1996) (smallest portion of property); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 80:24 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-8 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 10-23-8
(Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999).
146. See Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-18114 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.432(5)
(West 1999); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-215 (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-32
(West 1986).
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period of time following the foreclosure sale. 47 Post-sale redemption periods are
typically one to three years,"' with some jurisdictions creating shorter redemption
periods following judicial foreclosure proceedings.'49 Other jurisdictions establish a
grace period or statutory period of time for payment of delinquent taxes prior to the
occurrence of a final sale with little or no redemption period after the sale.5 It is also
not uncommon forjurisdictions to create different statutory periods oftime depending
on the nature of the use of the underlying property.'
147. See generally GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 7.1 (3d ed. 1994).
148. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-10-29 (1993) (three years after sale); ARiz.REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-18152 (West 1999) (three years after sale of liens); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-
120(1) (West 1990) (three years after sale of tax lien); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-157(f)
(West Supp. 1999) (one year after sale); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8758 (1989) (lienholders may
redeem 60 days after judicial confirmation of sale); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.502 (West 1999)
(two years after issuance of tax certificate); HAW. REv. STAT. § 246-60 (Supp. 1998) (one year
after sale); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4(a)(1) (Michie 1995) (one year); IOWA CODE ANN. §
447.9(1) (West Supp. 1999) (two years after sale); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-833(a)
(1994 & Supp. 1998) (at least six months after sale of lien); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 65
(Law. Co-op. 1990) (at least six months after sale); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-45-3 (1999) (two
years after sale); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.340(1) (West 1998) (two years after sale); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 15-18-111(l) (1997) (three years after sale);NEB.REV. STAT. § 77-1837 (1996)
(three years after sale); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:38(I) (1991) (two years after sale); N.D.
CENT. CODE §57-28-01 (1993) (threeyears aftersale); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 5721.37(A)(1)
(Anderson 1999) (oneyear after sale of lien); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3118(a) (West 1992
& Supp. 1999) (two years after sale); OR. REv. STAT. § 312.120(1) (1993) (two years after
judgment); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7293(a) (West 1997) (one year); RI. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-
25 (1995) (one year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-51-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (one year); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 10-25-1 (Michie 1996) (three years after sale ifwithin municipality); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-5-2702 (1998) (one year); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5260 (1994) (one year);
W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-19(a) (Supp. 1999) (12 to 15 months after sale); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
39-13-109(e)(i) (Lexis 1999) (fouryears).
149. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-4-40, -81(c) (1999) (1 year after nonjudicial sale; 60
days afterjudicial sale); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 941, 943 (West 1990) (18 months in
nonjudicial proceedings; 1 year followingjudicial sale);N.J. STAT.ANN. §§ 54:5-86, :5-104.34
(West Supp. 1999) (two years after nonjudicial sale; six months after judicial in rem
proceeding).
150. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-301(b) (Michie 1997) (two years before final sale); GA.
CODE ANN. § 48-4-78(a) (1999) (judicial tax foreclosure available only when taxes are
delinquent one year); IDAHO CODE § 63-1005(1) (1996) (three years before deed is issued);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.490(2), (3) (Michie Supp. 1998) (one year before sale); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 211.60 (three years for taxes prior to 1999), .78g (one year redemption
prior to forfeiture) (West 1998), amended by 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, §§ 60(2), 78g; NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 361.585(1), .570(1) (Michie 1993) (two years prior to issuance of deed);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-51(B)(3) (Michie 1998) (sale may not occur until three years of
delinquency); UTAH CODEANN. § 59-2-1343 (1996) (four years delinquency pre-sale); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 84.64.050 (West Supp. 1999) (three years delinquency pre-sale); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 74.57(2)(b) (West 1989) (two years delinquency pre-sale).
151. See, e.g., CAL. REV. &TAX. CODE §§ 3691(a)(1), (b) (West 1998) (fiveyears before
final sale; three years in the case of nuisance properties); 35 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 200/2 1-
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I In the absence of some strong disincentive, owners may delay payment of property
taxes as long as possible. In the early 1930s, roughly half the states imposed penalties
of 5-10% for nonpayment, and all jurisdictions added an interest charge, which
ranged from 6% to 18% annually.152 Higher statutory penalties and interests rates are
prevalent in every jurisdiction today, with penalties in the range of 10% and interest
in the range of 16-18% annually.' In lieu of penalties added upon delinquency, a
350 (West 1996) (two years after sale; six months for vacant land); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-
2401(a) (1997) (three years for homestead properties; one year for abandoned properties, all
others two years); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 279.06, 281.173 (West 1999) (three to five years
depending on location and usage of property; five weeks for abandoned property); TEx. TAX
CODEANN. § 34.21 (a)-(e) (West Supp. 2000) (six months, excepttwo years for homestead and
agricultural); VA. CODEANN. § 58.1-3965 (Michie 1999) (two years delinquency pre-sale; one
year where structures are a nuisance); 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 132, 133 (special provisions for
property which is certified as abandoned).
152. See Industrial Conference Board, supra note 65, at 73, 218-22 tbl. 19.
153. See ALA. CODE § 40-10-121(a) (1993) (12% annual interest); ALASKA STAT. §
29.45.250(a) (Lexis 1998) (20% penalty; 15% annual interest); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-
18053(a) to -18107(a) (West 1999) (5% penalty; 16% annual interest); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 4103(a) (West 1998) (redemption penalty of 1.5% per month); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-10-104.5(3) (West Supp. 1999) (1% interest per month); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-146 (West 1993) (18% annual interest); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-811(c) (1997) (10%
penalty; 1.5% interest monthly); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.402(2) (West 1999) (18% annual
interest); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 246-49, -60 (1993) (2/3%monthly interestpre-sale; 12% annual
interest post-sale, upto 10% penalty); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-201(7), -1001 (1996 & Supp. 1999)
(1% interest monthly; 2% late charge); 35 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 200/21-15 (West 1996) (1
1/2% interest monthly); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 445.39, 447.1 (West 1998) (1 1/2% interest
monthly pre-sale; 2% interest monthly post-sale); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-2004, -2968 (1997)
(1% above federal internal revenue code rate for underpayment of taxes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:2101(A)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (1% interest monthly); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §
892-A (West 1990) (rates established annually); MD. CODEANN., TAX-PROP. §§ 14-602, -702
(1994) (1% interest monthly on state taxes; others set locally); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 57,
ch. 60, § 62 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (14% annual interest pre-sale; 16% annual interest post-sale);
MINN. STAT.ANN. §§ 279.01, .03 (West 1998) (10-14% annual interest; 4-6% annual penalty);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-41-9, -45-3 (1999) (1% interest monthly pre-sale; 1 1/2% interest
monthly post-sale; 5% penalty); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 140.100, .340 (West 1998) (up to 10%
annual interest and 18% annual penalty); MONT. CODEANN. § 15-16-101 (1999) (10% annual
interest; 2% penalty); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-207 (1996) (14% annual interest); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 361.483(5), .5648(2)(d) (Michie Supp. 1997) (10% annual interest; penalties
ranging up to 15%); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80:32, :69 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (18% interest
post-sale); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-67(a) (West 1986) (up to 18% annual interest; up to 6%
premium); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-38-49, -50 (Michie 1998) (1% interest monthly; up to 5%
penalty); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-360(a), -374(i) (1997) (9% annual interest; 5% fee); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § § 323.121, 5703.47 (Anderson 1999) (annual interest at federal funds rate
plus 3%; 10% penalty); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2913(D) (West Supp. 1999) (18% annual
interest); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 7143, 7203,7293 (West 1997) (up to 10% annual interest;
5% penalty); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 12-51-90, -45-180(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (8% annual
interestpre-sale; 12% annual interest post-sale; 15%penalty); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-21-23
(Michie Supp. 1999) (10% annual interest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1331(2) (Supp. 1999)
(interest at federal discount rate plus 6%; 2% penalty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3202(b)(1),
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few jurisdictions create the same economic incentive by granting discounts for early
payment. 5 4 Penalties in some jurisdictions are clearly designed to accomplish more
than an incentive for prompt payment, as the penalties are cumulative annually and
may rapidly approach fair market value of the property. 5 Costs associated with
notices, advertisements, and judicial proceedings are invariably included in the
aggregate amount necessary to clear the delinquency, or redeem the property from
a sale. It is precisely these high rates of return which attract private investors to the
potential purchase of tax liens.
These various forms of property tax enforcement procedures throughoutthe United
States reflect the diversity of the marketplace of ideas, but also contain within them
a high degree of noncompliance with the constitutional due process requirements of
Mennonite. Jurisdictions that follow exclusively, or partially, a judicial tax
foreclosure process tend to have more comprehensive notice requirements included
within the procedures. Jurisdictions that rely on nonjudicial procedures tend to
minimize the notice given to interested parties, creating significant constitutional
doubts about the adequacy of notice. The analysis becomes even more complex in
light of the multiple stages, or events, in the enforcement of a property tax lien which
are common in most jurisdictions. Property may be sold at an initial tax sale with
minimal or no notice to interested parties, but with more comprehensive notice
provided at the stage of termination of the right of redemption. Unfortunately, over
the past forty years state and local governments have attempted to respond to
constitutional questions by expanding the procedures, and increasing notice
5136(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (in the case of a municipality collection, 1% interest monthly
post-sale; the state imposes a 5% penalty monthly up to a maximum of 25% of the original
unpaid tax liability in addition to variable interest); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3916 (Michie Supp.
1999) (municipalities may impose interest not exceeding the rate set by the Internal Revenue
Service or 10%, whichever is greater); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.56.020(5) (West Supp.
1999) (12% annual interest; 11% penalty); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 74.47(1)-(2) (West 1999) (1%
interest monthly; 1/2% penalty monthly, cumulative); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-108(b)(ii)
(Michie 1999) (18% annual interest); 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, § 60(3) (1 1/4% interest
monthly, 4% fee)
154. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134.020(2),.020(4), .460(1) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1998)
(2% discount for early payment, 10% annual interest; 12% annual interest on certificates of
delinquency); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-20-01, -09 (1993) (12% annual interest; 12% penalty;
"5% discount for early payment); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 311.500(1), .505(2), .505(3)(b) (Supp.
1998) (1 1/3% interest monthly; 5% penalty; 3% discount for early payment); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 67-5-1804,-2410(a)(1)(A) (1998) (10%penalty post-sale; up to 2% discountfor early
payment); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 31.05(b), 33.01(a), .01(c), 34.21(a) (West 1992 & Supp.
1999) (1% interest monthly; 12% penalty after one year, redemption premium of 25% within
one year, 50% during second year, up to 3% discount for early payment); W. VA. CODE §§
I 1A-1-3(a), -3-23(a) (1995) (9% annual interest for delinquent taxes; 1% interest monthly
post-sale; 2 1/2% discount for payment on time).
155. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-36-201(b), -202(b) (Michie 1997) (10% penalty; 10%
interest); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-3-8, -2-44, -4-42 (1999) (1% interest monthly, 10% penalty
pre-sale; 20% annual penalty); IND. CODEANN. §§ 6-1.1-24-2(a)(4), -37-10(a) (Michie 1995)
(10% annual interest; 10%penalty added every six months); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-1-7(b), -9-
19 (1995) (annual interest at prime rate plus 2%; 10% initial penalty plus 1% additional
penalty monthly).
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requirements only at one of the many stages in the process, and usually the final
stage. Both Mullane and Mennonite leave unresolved this issue of whether "notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action"'" requires a local government to inform the parties at the
very first step in the tax foreclosure process, or only at the very last step in the
termination of the rights of the interested parties.
When to give the constitutionally required notice is but part of the challenge facing
state and local legislative bodies responsible for the design of delinquent property tax
collection procedures. They must also make judgments about the amorphous standard
of "reasonableness" which the Mullane and Mennonite decisions use to describe the
constitutional duty. It is a question not just of when the notice is to be given, but also
what interests are entitled to notice, what actions must be undertaken to identify the
interests, and what efforts are necessary to locate names and addresses for the holders
of these interests.
IV. DUE PROCESS APPLIED: THEORY BECOMES PRACTICE
The notice requirements of due process, as established by Mullane and Mennonite,
offer few categorical lines. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that what is
required is a balancing of the interests of the state in collecting taxes and the
constitutional protection of individual interests. The reasonableness of the balance,
the Court suggests, depends on the particular circumstances.' Ajustification for the
loose nature of this balancing test of reasonableness may well lie in the fact that no
two jurisdictions follow precisely the same approach, and each has a different set of
circumstances. Federal constitutional rights, however, do not and should not depend
on the location of one's property. The challenge is to ascertain the constitutional floor
of the notice required by due process, and to establish that floor as the basis for each
jurisdiction, leaving the jurisdictions free to adopt their own procedures consistent
with that foundation.
In light of the wide variety of approaches across the country, the application of
federal constitutional due process standards to the enforcement of liens for delinquent
property taxes requires careful analysis of four separate questions. The threshold
question is what events or actions trigger the constitutional protections. The
156. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795 (1983).
157. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988).
In the years since Mullane the court has adhered to these principles, balancing the
"interest of the State" and "the individual interest sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." The focus is on the reasonableness of the balance, and,
as Mullane itself made clear, whether a particular method of notice is reasonable
depends on the particular circumstances.
Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see
also Municipality of Anchorage v. Wallace, 597 P.2d 148, 154 (Alaska 1979).
What we are requiring [mailed notice] is a fair adjustment or balance between the
rights of the municipal governmentto collect its taxes on the one hand, and on the
other, the right of a property owner not to be deprived of property except in a fair
and just manner.
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multiplicity of stages in the typical foreclosure process requires clarity as to the point
at which the government must provide notice to all interested parties. The second
question is the scope of the interests that fall within the range of "legally protected
property interests." Such interests are clearly entitledto notice, butthe Supreme Court
has yet to provide the substance of this broad category and there remains a wide range
of perspectives on this across the country. The third question involves the challenge
of identifying these interests. Only a few jurisdictions presently require title
examinations as part of the tax foreclosure process, but a large number are finding it
necessary to define with increasing specificity the scope of records to be examined
in order to identify the parties. The fourth question is in many ways the most difficult
one pragmatically-determining the contours of the constitutional obligations to
identify accurately the holders of the various interests and ascertain current addresses
for them.
A. Events Requiring Due Process
The constitutional due process requirement of notice does not apply to the
imposition of the property tax. Both the "caretaker" rationale and the rationale of the
importance of taxation to government, enunciated in the early twentieth century
Supreme Court analysis, support this result.'58 Every owner of property knows or
should know that real property is subject to taxation, and that the ability to impose
such taxes is essential to the provision of public services, particularly at the local
level. It is when the power to impose such taxes might result in the loss of property
interests that due process requires notice to interested parties.
At the earliest point in the process of enforcing payment of property taxes, the
occurrence of a delinquency, there is no constitutional requirement that the
government provide notice. Conversely, providing notice to an owner, or to
mortgagees, merely that property taxes have become delinquent is not sufficient
notice of procedures which may terminate the property rights. "[A] mortgagee's
knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a
tax sale is pending."'"9
The variety of approaches throughout the country can be divided roughly into three
categories for purposes of analyzing the event or events that trigger a notice
requirement. The first category is when the enforcement procedures contemplate one
event, such as a public sale or transfer of the property to the government, with no
redemption period following the event. The second category is when the enforcement
procedures contemplate only one event, but it is followed by a redemption period.
The nature of the redemption period in this second category of procedures is that it
is for a fixed period of time, commencing upon the event of sale or transfer and
expiring automatically in the absence of redemption. The third category contains
those procedures that contemplate two separate events in the property tax foreclosure
process. The jurisdictions which fall into this third category are those in which the
initial event is the sale of the property, and the second event is the termination of the
158. See Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 535 (1895).
159. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800.
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right of redemption. The occurrence of this second event must follow the first event
in order to terminate all rights of interested parties, but is independent of the first
event in terms of timing and process.
Jurisdictions that rely upon procedures in the first category face the simplest
constitutional duties of notice. When the applicable enforcement procedures involve
only a single event, such as a tax sale that is final and binding without any subsequent
statutory redemption period, the constitutionally required notice must be given ofthe
pendency of the sale."6° Thus, those jurisdictions that establish a minimum period of
time prior to the initiation of tax foreclosure proceedings, and which conduct a tax
foreclosure sale with no additional redemption period post-sale, are constitutionally
required to give notice only of the pending sale.'
Property tax procedures that fall into the second category may also avoid the need
to provide constitutionally adequate notice on multiple occasions. If the statutory
procedures provide for.adequate notice to all interested parties at the commencement
of enforcement proceedings, this may be sufficient notice in certain circumstances.
When, for example, the enforcement proceeding involves judicial action followed by
a fixed redemption period, with no sale or public auction of the property, notice of
the commencement of the judicial proceeding is sufficient notice of the entire
enforcement proceeding and no separate notice must be given of the end of the
redemption period. 6 2 Even in a nonjudicial proceeding in which a tax lien mortgage
is filed, followed by the expiration of a fixed redemption period without a sale, if
constitutionally adequate notice is given of the filing of the tax lien mortgage, no
additional notice is required of the forfeiture of the property at the expiration of the
redemption period. 63 Thus, when the proceeding is one continuous proceeding,
whether judicial or nonjudicial in nature, and all subsequent events flow
automatically from the commencement of the proceeding through the termination of
property rights (in the absence of redemption), then interested parties who receive
adequate notice at the commencement of the proceedings have been given adequate
notice of the statutory course of events. Constitutionally adequate notice given at the
outset of a proceeding to enforce a property tax lien should constitute adequate notice
of the entire proceeding, with no additional constitutional'6 notice requirements only
160. See M & P Enters., Inc. v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 944 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1997).
161. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Dutch Lane Assocs., 810 F. Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Taxes, 607 N.E.2d 1160 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992). For jurisdictions which establish a minimum period pre-sale, see supra text
accompanying note 150.
162. See Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 652 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[D]ue process
only requires notice of the 'pendency of the action' and an opportunity to respond.... Once
the City sent this notice, it was not required to send additional notices as each step in the
foreclosure proceeding was completed or when each of the available remedies was about to
lapse."); see also Calhoun v. Jennings, 512 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind. 1987) ("[T]he due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require that actual notice be given of either the
lapse of the redemption period or the subsequent issuance of the tax deed.").
163. See Cummings v. Town of Oakland, 430 A.2d 825 (Me. 1981).
164. The emphasis here is on the notice requirements necessary to comply with Fourteenth
Amendment due process. This is not to suggest that state statutes do not, or should not, create
statutory obligations for additional forms of notice of subsequent proceedings. There may be
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in these limited circumstances. In both the first and second categories of procedures,
notice of the event, or proceeding, must be filed of public record in order to provide
notice of the proceeding to all parties who may acquire interests subsequent to the
commencement of the proceeding. 65
It is the third category of property tax enforcement procedures that faces the
greatest constitutional difficulties in providing adequate notice on multiple occasions.
Jurisdictions have adopted multistage enforcement proceedings for a variety of
reasons, such as a public policy desire to afford property owners as much latitude as
possible to pay their taxes, a policy decision to sell tax liens and allow private
investors to conduct the tax foreclosures, or a legislative decision to remedy
procedural defects by adding procedures instead of reforming the existing procedures.
Ironically, however, these multistage proceedings face a more substantial
constitutional hurdle. The existence of multistage procedures may well give rise to
constitutional duties at each stage.
When an initial event, whether a sale of a tax lien or a sale of the property, is
followed by a subsequent event, such as a final tax sale or a termination of a
redemption right, and the latter event is not solely dependent on the passage of time,
adequate notice of the first event is not adequate notice of the final event. For
example, where a state statute specifies constitutionally adequate notice at the
creation of a tax lien mortgage, but no notice of the subsequent issuance of a tax
deed, the procedure is constitutionally deficient) 6 When there is adequate notice of
the sale of a tax lien to third parties, but the timing and circumstances of the final
termination of property rights are left to the discretion of the tax lien purchaser, the
initial notice provides little, if any, information to the interested parties about when
their rights will be finally terminated, and by whom. Due process requires more than
notice that you may lose your property rights for nonpayment of taxes at some
unknown date in the future.'67 Thus, state statutes that create a discretionary period
of time for final termination of property rights, usually by specifying only a
minimum, as opposed to a fixed, redemption period, should be subject to
constitutional scrutiny for the adequacy of notice of the final event. Adequate notice
of the commencement of the enforcement proceedings is not adequate notice when
a third party has wide discretion on the timing and circumstances in which to invoke
final termination of rights. In these contexts constitutionally adequate notice must be
given of the initial event and of the final event.
For corresponding reasons it is doubtful that giving constitutionally adequate notice
only at the final step of a multistage enforcement proceeding will be sufficient. If
statutory procedures contemplate a two-stage process, either with an initial sale
strong policy grounds for such additional notice. For purposes ofpresent analysis, the essential
step is to appreciate the distinction between the constitutionally mandated notice, and such
additional notice as may be required by statute. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Forth, 528
N.E.2d 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that failure to comply with statutory notice
invalidates tax deed, without need to address constitutional claims).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
166. See First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 639 A.2d 1089 (N.H. 1994).
167. See In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Taxes, 607 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992) ("[T]he fact that [the mortgagee] knew that the sale of the subject property would
take place some time in the future is not equivalent to notice of the time and place of sale.").
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followed by a subsequent termination of a right of redemption, or an initial sale
followed by a subsequent order or date for issuance of a tax deed, the failure to
provide adequate notice at the commencement of the procedures may render the
entire proceeding invalid. Some jurisdictions have held that the only notice that is
constitutionally required is notice of the final event, such as the issuance of a tax
deed. "' Others have held that adequate notice of foreclosure of the right of
redemption is not a substitute for notice of a prior tax sale. 69 If notice, in a
constitutionally adequate form, is given only at the final step, it is likely that
substantial interest, penalties, and costs will have accrued, and there is often no
opportunity for a hearing. 71
Constitutionally adequate notice of only a single event in the property tax
foreclosure process is clearly adequate notice of the entire process in only the first
category. When there is but a single event which controls and determines the rights
of the parties to the property, adequate notice of the event needs only be given once
if the notice includes notice of the time and place of the sale. In the second category
of procedures, so long as the redemption period is self-executing and notice of the
event is of public record, notice given only once still constitutes sufficient notice. In
multistaged tax enforcement proceedings, adequate notice of an initial event is not
adequate notice of the final event. When there is a multistaged proceeding and notice
is given only of the final event which terminates the rights of interested parties, such
notice only of the final event, and no earlier events, may still be sufficient if there is
a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and to exercise redemption rights. The
weakness of this latter conclusion is that the failure to provide adequate notice of the
earlier stages in the enforcement proceeding increases the redemption amount by
additional interest, penalties and costs, and shortens the period of time in which an
interested party may act to protect its property interests. Jurisdictions utilizing a
multistaged property tax enforcement procedure are therefore required to provide
constitutionally adequate notice to all interested parties at each stage of the
proceedings. 7'
168. See Rosewell v. Cook County Treasurer, 512 N.E.2d 1256, 1261-62 (Ill. 1987)
(holding that procedure is adequate so long as there is still constitutionally adequate notice and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard); see also Acirema, N.V. v. Lilly, No. CIV.A. 1:96-0559,
1997 WL 876738, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 11, 1997), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1157 (4th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting in dicta that notice prior to the end of the redemption period was sufficient, and
that notice prior to the initial sheriff's sale was not constitutionally required).
169. See Ashness v. Tomasetti, 643 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1994).
170. See McCann v. Scaduto, 519 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y. 1987). But see Durham v. United Cos.
Fin. Corp., 503 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1998) (holding, on statutory construction grounds only, that
notice to mortgagee only of a final 30 day period before issuance of tax deed was permissible,
even though no notice was given of prior tax sale and redemption period).
171. See First NHBank, 639 A.2d at 1095 (holding that state constitution requires notice
to the mortgagee of the issue date of tax lien deeds, the expiration of the right of redemption,
and a warning that the mortgage will be eradicated by the tax lien deed); White v. Lee, 470
A.2d 849 (N.H. 1983).
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B. "Legally Protected Property Interests"
The basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Mennonite is that a mortgagee holds
"a legally protected property interest" 72 which is substantially affected by a tax sale.
The Court did not go further and describe the range of such property interests, and
it has been left to legislatures and lower courts to attempt to define the parameters of
interests entitled to due process protections in this context. It is accurate that
Mennonite did not impose "a blanket requirement of notice to every party with a
publicly recorded interest in property,"' but it is also true that many interested
parties, other than the owner and mortgagees, have enforceable property rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. A substantial minority of jurisdictions
continue to require notice only to owners and mortgagees, leaving them open to
constitutional attacks by interested parties other than owners and mortgagees. 174
A statutory requirement of notice to owners and mortgagees of record potentially
leaves without adequate notice parties such as land sale contract purchasers, lessees,
and judgment creditors, even though they may have an interest of record. A statutory
requirement that notice be given to all parties having an interest of record
encompasses the overwhelming majority of property rights, but will not serve to
provide notice to occupants of the property pursuant to unrecorded leases, or parties
in adverse possession of the property. There is also a range of interests for which
there may be question as to whether they are property rights entitled to the protection
of due process.175 A right of redemption, even if held by someone other than the
172. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983); see also District of
Columbia v. Mayhew, 601 A.2d 37, 42-43 (D.C.1991); In re Tax Deed Petition of Thomas,
587 N.E.2d 637 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
173. FDIC v. Lee, 933 F. Supp. 577, 580 (E.D. La. 1996).
174. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 40-10-4, -73, -74 (1993) (notice to owners, mortgagees, and
lienholders); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-18202(A)(1) (West 1999) (notice to property owner
only); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, § 16 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (notice to owner and to mortgagees
who file request for notice); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 279.091, 281.13 (West 1999) (notice to
taxpayers and to mortgagees of record); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-43-1, -3, -5 (1999) (notice
to owners and to mortgagees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80:38-a, :38-b (1991 & Supp. 1998)
(notice to owner and to mortgagees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-26 (West Supp. 1999) (notice to
owner); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-66 (Michie 1998) (notice to owner and holders of liens or
security interests); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3118 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (notice to
owner and mortgagees ofrecord); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-9-10(a), -11 (1995) (only owners and
mortgagees are entitled to mailed notice; other interested parties receive notice by publication
and posting); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-49-300, -51-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1998), 12-
51-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (notice to owner and to mortgagees); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3965(A) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999) (notice to owner and mortgagees); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
75.12(1), .521(3)(c) (West 1999) (notice to owner and mortgagees of record); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B) (Michie 1999) (notice to owner, occupant, and mortgagees).
175. For example, a party, other than a current owner, personally liable for indebtedness
secured by a mortgage which is affected by a tax sale is not constitutionally entitled to notice
of the tax sale. See French Mkt. Homestead v. Portillo, 562 So. 2d 1139 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
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original owner at the time the taxes became delinquent, is a property interest entitled
to such protection. 76 In the context of shared property interests, such as easements
and covenants, clarity of analysis is no less significant.
1. Owners
The obligation to provide notice to interested parties usually focuses first on the
underlying owner in fee simple of the property which is subject to delinquent tax
enforcement proceedings. Property ownership, however, is rarely simple, and it is
necessary to give separate consideration to parties who acquire interests during the
course of the enforcement proceedings, to concurrent owners, to the holders of
present and future interests, and to parties who are acquiring the property through
installment land contracts.
Parties who acquire interests in property after the commencement of the
proceedings to enforce a lien for delinquent taxes may not have an independent right
to notice of events or steps in the process which occur after they acquired their
interests. This proposition rests on the factual determination of whether there is
recorded evidence of the commencement of the proceeding, such that subsequent
purchasers are deemed to be on record noiice of the pendency of the proceeding,'"
and whether the subsequent purchaser itself recorded its interest. 78 If there is no
publicly recorded evidence of the commencement of the proceedings, then parties
who acquire interests prior to a final tax sale, and record evidence of their interests,
are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice of the sale.'79
Where property is held in a form of concurrent ownership, such as a tenancy in
common, and the entire property interest is subject to the tax enforcement proceeding,
notice should be given to each of the owners of the undivided interests. 80 It is not
sufficient to provide notice to only one concurrent owner, identifying the other
176. See Tax Lien Services v. Hall, 919 P.2d 396 (Mont. 1996).
177. See Nitchie Barrett Realty Corp. v. Biderman, 704 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); City
of Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22 (Me. 1974); In re King County for the Foreclosure of
Liens for Delinquent Real Property Taxes, 811 P.2d 945 (Wash. 1991).
178. See Brown v. Greig, 740 P.2d 1186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that notice must be
given to parties holding ownership of record, even though property was transferred pursuant
to an unrecorded deed).
179. See Campbell v. Siegfried, 823 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Buescher v. Jaquez,
677 P.2d 615 (N.M. 1983). Conversely, a party who acquires the underlying property during
the enforcement proceedings, but who fails to record the contract, is not in a position to insist
on notice of the proceedings. See Crager v. Fry, 479 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). If a
party acquires the pre-existing interest of a party, after the commencement of proceedings, and
the subsequent party's identity and address are ascertainable from the records, such subsequent
party should be given notice of the final step of the proceedings. See Wylie v. Patton, 720 P.2d
649 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
180. See Olson v. Town of Fitzwilliam, 702 A.2d 318 (N.H. 1997); Morrow v. Bobbitt, 943
S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). When property is held by a limited partnership, notice to
the general partner alone should be adequate, and separate notice to the limited partners is not
required. See Winter Park Devil's Thumb Inv. Co. v. BMS Partnership, 926 P.2d 1253 (Colo.
1996). Notice sent to husband and wife, and signed for by husband alone, is adequate notice
to both husband and wife. See Shamblin v. Beasley, 967 P.2d 1200 (Okla. 1999).
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owners as "et al."'I' Providing notice to one concurrent owner but failing to provide
adequate notice to another concurrent owner will leave the latter owner's interest
unaffected. 2 If legal, as opposed to equitable, title clearly vests in one person, notice
to that person alone is sufficient. 3 If the taxes are delinquent only as to a portion of
the property held in an undivided interest, notice to the holder of the interest which
is delinquent is sufficient and notice to a concurrent owner is not required as the
concurrent interest is not subject to the enforcement proceedings.' 4
When ownership of the property is divided between present and future interests,
and the entire underlying fee is subject to the tax enforcement proceeding, the holders
of both present and future interests should be given notice. Thus, if the present
possessory property interest is held in a life estate, both the life tenant and the parties
holding the remainder interests should be given notice." 5 If ownership ofthe property
is held in a defeasible fee, such as a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject
to a condition subsequent, and the nature of the limitation is not affected by a transfer
of the property in a tax sale, there should be no need to give notice to the holders of
the possibility of reverter or right of entry as the defeasance clause of their interest
will not be affected by the tax enforcement proceeding.'86
When property is subject to a land sales contract, particularly a long term
installment sales contract, both the seller and the purchaser under the contract have
substantial property interests entitled to due process.' If the contract is recorded,
there is clear evidence of the interests, and if the contract is not recorded, the issue is
not whether they lack interests deserving of due process protection, but whether the
government can identify the interests and appropriate addresses. Notice addressed
181. See Jenkins v. Richmond County, 394 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
182.SeeMasickv. City of Schenectady, 564N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1991). See infra Part
IV.F. on the effects generally of the provision of inadequate notice.
183. See Van Raden Homes, Inc. v. Dakota View Estates, 546 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1996).
184. See Clallam County v. Folk, 922 P.2d 73 (Wash. 1996).
185. See Wright v. Spriggs, 567 So. 2d 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Brashears v. Collison,
115 A.2d 289 (Md. 1955); Brewen v. Leachman, 657 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Freeman v. City of Kingsport, 926 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
186. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 200/22-15 (West 1996) (stating that holders of
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter shall not be deemed parties interested in the
property); Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that owner of property abutting abandoned railroad right of way had sufficient interest
so as to be entitled to notice).
187. See Harris v. Gaul, 572 F. Supp. 1544 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Gainerv. Brown, 558 N.E.2d
867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Dow v. State, 240 N.W.2d 450 (Mich. 1976); Foreclosure of Tax
Liens v. Young, 316 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 1982). There is no reason why a similar result should
not be reached in the context of a right of first refusal. However, relying solely on statutory
interpretation, one court has held that a right of first refusal, even if the identity and address
of the holder of the right are available in the public records, is not entitled to actual notice. See
Ayres v. Townsend, 598 A.2d 470 (Md. 1991).
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simply to the "occupant" will not suffice to provide notice to a purchaser under such
a contract.'88 Several jurisdictions which recognize long term contracts for deed
specifically require notice to both sellers and purchasers under such contracts.'89
2. Creditors
Though mortgages are legally protected property interests for purposes of the Due
Process Clause, I" extension ofthe same recognition to the class ofjudgment creditors
has not been as clear. Part of the reason for this is that while mortgagees, by
definition, have some interest in real property as security for their debt, the claim of
an unsecured creditor is not necessarily perceived as a property interest.' 9' In Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,"2 however, the United States Supreme
Court held that the intangible interest of an unsecured creditor is an interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. Upon the filing of a
judgment in the appropriate records, a creditor obtains a lien against the real property
of the judgment debtor, placing him in a stronger position than a class of unsecured
creditors. In recent years both federal 93 and state courts"9 have concluded that
judgment creditors do have sufficient interest in property so as to be entitled to due
process notice. The holder of a tax certificate, held pending the completion of
enforcement proceedings, is in functionally the same position and is also entitled to
adequate notice.'95
3. Occupants
The due process rights ofoccupants of property subjectto property tax enforcement
proceedings require a careful distinction between two separate points inherent in the
Mullane and Mennonite analysis. The threshold point is whether the party has a
sufficient interest so as to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees; the second
188. See City of Detroit v. John J. Blake Realty Co., 376 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984).
189. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.502(4)(d) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-18-
111(3) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-23-2.4 (Michie 1996); see also Randall Thomsen,
Washington State Property Tax Foreclosures: Quoerere Dat Sapere Quoe Sunt Legitima Vere,
32 GONZ. L. REv. 123, 143-44 (1996).
190. Deeds of Trust are treated the same as mortgages for purposes of constitutional notice
requirements. See Wylie v. Patton, 720 P.2d 649, 653 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); Lohr v. Cobur
Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1983).
191. See Nelson v. Every, No. 87-1665, 1988 WL 143145 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1988)
(holding that Wisconsin law did not recognize ajudgment lien as entailing an interest in the
property subject to a tax sale).
192. 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).
193. See Verba v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1988).
194. See Parkview Oak Subdiv. Corp. v. Tridico, 667 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (La. Ct. App.
1995); New Brunswick Say. Bank v. Markouski, 587 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 1991); Central Trust
Co., N.A. v. Spencer, 535 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Nolfv. Schumo, 479 A.2d 940
(Pa. 1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Meyer, 476 N.W.2d 267 (S.D. 1991).
195. See Township of Jefferson v. Block 447A, Lot 10, 548 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988).
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point is whether the identity and address of that party are reasonably ascertainable.
Unfortunately, courts and legislatures have at times conflated these points and
concluded that because the identity of an occupant may be difficult to ascertain, the
occupant does not have a property interest deserving of protection. The rationale of
the importance of tax collection, and the avoidance of imposing burdens on the
government, is used to justify a result that fails to make the proper distinction. 96
A lease is a substantial property right that entitles a lessee, in the presence of state
action, to constitutionally adequate notice of a proceeding that may terminate its
interests. 97 Several states, by statute, recognize the substantial interest which may be
held by an occupant of property, and expressly require that notice of tax enforcement
proceedings be given to the occupant, or to parties in possession of the property. 98
If the lease is of record, then those jurisdictions that require notice to be given to all
parties with an interest of record anticipate notice to all lessees of record as well."9
The more difficult situation arises in the context of occupants of property who may
not have any evidence or record of their possessory interest. The interests of parties
in possession which are not shown of record may well be the interests of an owner
pursuant to an unrecorded deed, a lessee in possession pursuant to an unrecorded
lease, or an adverse possessor in possession of the property for decades. In all
jurisdictions such interests are valuable interests in real property which may be
enforced in certain circumstances against third parties. There is little reason to
exclude categorically such interests from the protection of due process guarantees
even in the context of tax foreclosures. The issue should not be the identity of their
196. See Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 612, 618-19 (D. Md. 1998).
I am constrained to the view that neither the holding nor the rationale of
Mennonite undermines the presumed constitutionality of Maryland's election to
employ constructive noticeby publication to extinguish the unrecorded leasehold
interest of one in actual possession of real property in a tax sale setting....
... I am persuaded that Maryland has a significant interest in encouraging
participation in its tax sale program and in decreeing marketable title. Further,
Maryland's tax sale mechanism is an effective means of collecting property taxes
for the state, and is critical to the state's need to provide a source of revenue for
a host of governmental services provided to its citizens. Requiring a local tax
collector or a tax sale purchaser to identify holders of unrecorded interests at the
early stages of the process would be extraordinarily burdensome, and would very
likely discourage prospective purchasers from participating in tax sales. If this
were to happen, the state's significant interest in combating abandonment of
properties, especially in urban areas, and in securing for its citizens the revenue
necessary to carry out important governmental functions, would be frustrated.
Id.
197. See Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 787 (5th Cir. 1989).
198. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-4-45(a)(1)(B), -78 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. §§
14-834, -836(b)(4)(i)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1998); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1832 (1996);N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-28-04 (1993 & Supp. 1999) (amended by S.L. 1999, ch. 503, § 124); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 39-13-108(e)(V)(B)(I) (Michie 1999); 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, § 78i(3). It is
entirely possible that more than one party will be in possession of property. See Nelson v.
Forbes, 545 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
199. See Taylor v. Lutin, 102 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1940); In re Application for Tax Deed, 675
N.E.2d 285 (II1. App. Ct. 1997); Weathers v. Anderson, 189 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 1971).
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property interests; it should be the challenge posed in identifying and providing
notice to such parties. The names of such parties are not likely to be reasonably
ascertainable, but the address of the property is a premise of the foreclosure action.
In this context, the constitutionally required notice should be mailed notice, addressed
to the "occupant," 2" and notice of the tax enforcement procedure posted on the
property. Such steps can be taken with minimal additional effort in light of the notices
being sent to all other identifiable interested parties.2 0 1
4. Shared Interests
When property rights are divided according to use, such as in the context of
easements and real covenants, there is less of a question of due process application
and more of an issue of the appropriate public policy treatment of such interests.
There is little doubt that easements and covenants are substantial real property
interests, but the primary emphasis appears to be on ensuring that property tax
enforcement proceedings do not adversely affect the existence of such interests. A
number of states expressly exclude by statute easements and covenants from the
scope of the proceeding, leaving them unaffected." 2 In a jurisdiction in which
easements are expressly excluded from tax sales, but not real covenants, judicial
construction has applied the exception to real covenants as well.2°3 In other
jurisdictions easements and covenants are unaffected by a tax foreclosure as a matter
of judicial interpretation. The rationale is that property taxes are imposed on real
property assessed as encumbered by an easement, or restrictive covenant, so that the
200. Mailed notice addressed to the occupant may also serve, at minimal cost, as additional
notice to an owner who resides on the property. See Dawson v. Douglas, 849 P.2d 441 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1993).
201. Some jurisdictions require, in addition to mailed notice to all interested parties, a copy
of the notice be mailed to the "occupant" and posted on the property. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-4-78(d) (1999). This approach reaffirms that there are more than just three methods of
providing notice-personal service, mailed notice, or constructive notice by publication-and
avoids the need to respond to the due process rights of occupants by placing them in one of
these three categories. See, e.g., Overstreet v. City of Raleigh, 330 S.E.2d 643 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that adverse possessor entitled only to notice by publication, not personal
notice).
202. See CAL. REv. &TAX. CODE § 3712(d) (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.573 (West
1999); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/22-70 (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4(d)
(Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 45 (West 1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 140.722 (West Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 3145-3147 (West 1992);
TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.05(c) (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.35.290 (West
Supp. 1999) (covering easements only); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 75.14(4) (West 1999) (excepting
restrictive covenants other than certain affirmative covenants to pay money); 1999 Mich. Pub.
Acts 123, § 78k(5)(e).
203. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-7 (1999); Hendley v. Overstreet, 318 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1984);
Smith v. Gwinnett County, 286 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. 1982).
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taxes themselves are not levied on an unencumbered fee simple but on the fee as
encumbered.2 4 Thus, the super-priority nature of the tax lien attaches, in effect, after
the priority of the easement or covenant.
As one moves towards the more unusual, and creative, usage of easements,
covenants, conditions and other restrictions found in condominiums, planned unit
developments, and subdivisions, a similar result occurs, though with varying
rationales. One explanation which has been offered, which is circular in its reasoning,
is that the holders of the benefit of condominium covenants do not hold a substantial
property interest entitling them to notice, and because no notice is given, the interests
are unaffected. 20 5 A more straightforward analysis is based on statutory exclusion of
such shared interests, on judicial acknowledgment of the adverse public policy
consequences of terminating easements and covenants through tax sales, 2° or on the
proposition that such interests are substantial interests but that failure to provide
notice leaves the interests unaffected.0 7 A few jurisdictions have created special
statutory procedures for enforcement of tax liens on common areas held by
homeowners associations20 8 and time share units.209
C. Identifying the Interests
In light of this broad range of property interests which are entitled to the
constitutional protections of due process in the context of enforcement ofproperty tax
liens, the challenge confronting state and local governments is to establish procedures
which identify such interests. For most of the twentieth century this has been the
primary source of resistance to changing from notice by publication to other forms
of notice. A comprehensive title examination is the single most effective means of
identifying interested parties, but it can also be an expensive undertaking on a parcel
by parcel basis. On parcels of land with relatively low value, the cost of a title
examination may approximate the annual amount of property taxes due from that
parcel. When the costs of a title examination, however, are weighed against the
average annual property tax bill, multiple years of tax delinquency, and the larger
adverse effects of abandoned tax delinquent properties, the cost of a title examination
is small in relation to these greater costs.
Mennonite did not expressly create a requirement that full title examinations occur
as part of the procedures for tax lien enforcement. The emphasis, in the majority
204. See Thirteen South Ltd. v. Summit Village, Inc., 866 P.2d 257 (Nev. 1993);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McGurk, 193 A. 696 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1937), afd, 197 A. 47 (N.J.
1938); Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946).
205. See In re King County for the Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Real Property Taxes,
811 P.2d 945 (Wash. 1991).
206. See City of Olympia v. Palzer, 728 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1986); see also Scott v. Seek Lane
Venture, Inc., 605 A.2d 942 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (finding a duty to notify homeowners
association of foreclosure of common areas). See generally Daniel W. Galvin, Note, The Effect
of Tax Foreclosure Sales on Servitudes: Olympia v. Palzer, I I U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 193
(1987).
207. See Wittemyer v. Cole, 689 P.2d 720 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
208. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-836(b)(4)(i)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
209. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 942-A (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
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opinion, was on whether the interested party was "reasonably identifiable."2 ' The
dissent in Mennonite stressed that reasonableness required a balancing of the state's
interest in tax collection against the burden of identifying the protected interests. 21'
Five years after Mennonite, the United States Supreme Court, in Tulsa Professional
Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,2" expanded upon Mennonite and applied due
process notice requirements to the class of unsecured creditors in probate
proceedings. The Court concluded that unsecured creditors, whose identities are not
available through any title examination, nonetheless have a right to more than notice
by publication. This balancing led to the conclusion that mailed notice "to known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors is not so cumbersome as to unduly hinder the
dispatch with which the probate proceedings are conducted."2 3 The basic proposition
of Mennonite, that a party whose identity can be found in the public records is
entitled to mailed notice, was strengthened by the reasoning of Tulsa.214
In the aftermath of Mennonite and Tulsa, many states now have notice
requirements that reach those property interests that are reflected in the public land
records. A majority ofjurisdictions presently takes an approach that functionally, if
not expressly, requires a title examination by mandating notice to owners,
mortgagees, lienholders and other parties whose interests are of record.2 5
Traditionally a tax collector might examine solely those records within the office of
the collector, and not undertake an examination of the land records more generally.216
In the absence of statutory requirements for a title examination, there is a split of
judicial opinion regarding the government's obligation to examine records other than
210. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983).
211. Id. at 806.
212. 485 U.S. 478 (1988). Justice O'Connor authored the opinion in Tulsa, expanding the
scope of due process protections, after having written the dissent in Mennonite.
213. Id. at 490.
214. This expansion ofthe"burden" placed upon local governments is notwithout criticism.
See Carla Williams Tanner, Forfeited and Delinquent Lands: Resolving the Due Process
Deficiencies, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 251, 271 (1993) (calling the requirements "a somewhat
unrealistic standard for the state to obtain").
215. See ARK. CODEANN. § 26-37-301(c) (Michie 1997); CAL. REV. &TAX. CODE §§ 3701,
4675 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-128(1) (West 1990 & Supp.
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-157(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
197.502(4) (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-4-45(a)(1), -77(1) (1999); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 6-1.1-24-1.9 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 447.9(l)-(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 1999);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91.4884(1) (Michie Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-
836(b) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.405 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §
15-18-111(3) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1832 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
361.595(3)(b) (Michie 1993); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1125(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-375(c) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-28-04(2) (1993 & Supp. 1999);
OIno REv. CODE ANN. § 5721.14(B) (Anderson 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 312.125(1) (1993
& Supp. 1998); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7193.2(a)(3) (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-25-3
(Michie 1996); TENN. CODEANN. § 67-5-2502(c) (1998); UTAHCODEANN. § 59-2-135 1(2)(a)
(1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.64.050(4) (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE §
1IA-3-19(a) (1995 & Supp. 1999); 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123, § 78i(I), (2).
216. See Guy Lamoyne Black, Tax Titles in Utah: Caveats for Potential Purchasers and
Proposals for Change, 1991 BYU L. REv. 1573, 1580 n.42.
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those maintained by the tax officials themselves." 7 A few courts have held that while
the government has imputed knowledge of all information contained in the tax
records, the government is not required to search all public land records.21 ' Other
courts have held that the government does have a constitutional obligation to examine
public land records that are within the government's possession and control. 9
Though there is growing consensus on the necessity of examining both the records
of the tax collector, and the land records, there is little consensus on the need to
search other records to identify interested parties. If an examination of probate
records can* easily identify interested parties, then such an examination may be
required,"0 but the burden would be excessive if the government were held to a
standard of identifying every potential heir or beneficiary in a probate proceeding.2 2'
It is hard to discern why a physical inspection of the property searching for clues as
to the identity of the owner may be required as a "reasonably diligent' effort,t' but
checking land records is not.'m
The due process standard for notice as it has evolved from Mullane to Mennonite
in recent years no longer permits state and local governments to rely upon the ease
of notice by publication to notify property owners and other interested parties of a
property tax enforcement proceeding. All interests which may be readily identified
in public records are legally protected interests, and such records include at a
minimum the records of the tax collector and the public records used for transferring
and recording interests in real property. Some form of title examination, as part of the
enforcementproceeding, is thus essential in orderto meet the constititional guarantee
of due process. The only remaining ambiguity pertains to the scope of the review of
the public records, such as the nature of information that may be revealed in probate
proceedings.
217. A tax official may be held to be on notice of information contained in the records of
other tax officials. See Kron v. VanCleave, 339 So. 2d 559, 562 (Miss. 1976). Conversely, an
examination of land records, but not municipal tax records, is insufficient. See Kennedy v.
Cummings, 603 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
218. See Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Sims, 630 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); see also Bequette v. S.I.V.I., 184 B.R. 327,
338 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that tax purchaser is required to search real estate and tax
records, but is not required to search outside the chain of title in order to ascertain interested
parties).
219. See In re Application of County Treasurer, 576 N.E.2d 255, 261-62 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991); Lamontagne v. Knightly, 572 N.E.2d 1375, 1380 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Isern v.
Summerfield, 956 P.2d 28, 31 (Mont. 1998); Bell v. Anderson, 849 P.2d 350, 352 (Nev.
1993); DeFranco v. Sullivan County, 492 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1985). Discovering an error
in the indexing of documents in the public land records has been held to be an extraordinary
effort beyond thatwhich the Constitution requires. See CitizensNat'l Bank v. Dunnaway, 400
S.E.2d 888, 892-93 (W. Va. 1990).
220. See In re Application of County Collector, 516 N.E.2d 736 (il. App. Ct. 1987);
Robertson v. Plymouth, 468 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
221. See Bender v. City of Rochester, 765 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1985).
222. See Gacki v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 669 N.E.2d 936 (ill. App. Ct. 1996) (inspecting the
premises, or contacting neighbor, might have enabled notice to be given to occupant).
223. See Elizondo, 588 N.E.2d at 504 (finding no duty to search records of other offices
such as the recorder or the court clerk).
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Those jurisdictions that create separate procedural requirements for different
classes of property based upon its use or value cannot avoid the essential
requirements of due process. Efficiency, even in light of properties with low market
values, does not override constitutional guarantees. "[T]he value ofaproperty interest
does not measure the scope of the constitutional protection against a taking without
just compensation and a deprivation of property without due process."'
D. Notifying the Holders of the Interests
Part ofthe reason for the current lack of clarity and consistency in the interpretation
and application of the Mullane-Mennonite-Tulsa standard of due process in property
tax enforcement proceedings is the blurring of two distinct tasks. Assuming there is
consensus on the nature of the legally protected property interests, the first task is the
identification by a title examination of the interests that would be adversely affected
by an enforcement proceeding. The second task is the provision of notice to the
identified parties.
This second task, of providing notice to the holders of the identified interests, is far
more elusive in its interpretation and application. Constructive notice, or notice by
publication, is not an acceptable form of notice unless the interested party "is not
reasonably identifiable.""5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision issued
shortly after Mennonite, correctly recognized that Mennonite shifted the emphasis of
the balancing test from identifying the interests which are entitled to protection "to
a more focused examination of whether the names of such persons are 'reasonably
ascertainable."' 6 The current constitutional standard is that notice must be sent to
those parties whose names and addresses are reasonably ascertainable based upon
"reasonably diligent efforts." 7
When the name and address of an interested party are ascertainable from the tax
collector's records, or the deed records, notice must be mailed to such address."s
There is wide variance, however, in interpreting the scope of the government's duty
when notice is mailed to the last known address available from the public records and
is returned as undeliverable. A small minority ofjurisdictions have held that a diligent
224. Brandon Township v. Tomkow, 535 N.W.2d 268,271 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). But see
Lamontagne, 572 N.E.2d at 1379 (holding less effort by a municipality constitutes reasonable
diligence in the case of low value land).
225. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983); see also Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (holding that notice by publication in an eminent
domain proceeding is inadequate when a party name and address are readily ascertainable in
deed records and tax rolls).
226. Bender, 765 F.2d at 11; see also Richard L. Skow, Comment, Constitutional
Law--Davis Oil v. Mills: Proper Notice in the Foreclosure Setting Under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, 20 MEMPHis ST. U. L. REv. 451, 458 (1990).
227. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798 n.4.
228. See Bogart v. Lathrop, 523 P.2d 838 (Nev. 1974); see also Bell v. Anderson, 849 P.2d
350, 352 (Nev. 1993) (stating that the county must make a reasonable inquiry as to ownership
of the property by consulting the county's land title records); Miles Homes v. City of
Westhope, 458 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D. 1990) (finding a duty to search file of tax payment
receipts for possibility of correct address).
[Vol. 75:747
TAX LIENS, TAX SALES, AND DUE PROCESS
inquiry in such circumstances is limited to making sure that no other addresses are
available from tax records and deed records, and beyond that no further duties are
imposed by due process. 9 If accurate addresses are available in the public records,
whether provided by a change of address notice given by the owner, or due to a
mistake in the tax collector's office in identifying common ownership of contiguous
parcels," notice must be given to those addresses. If accurate addresses are not
available from existing public records, according to these opinions, there is no
obligation to search further. 2 The analysis of reasonable diligence, limiting the
burden of the government in this context, is always highly fact specific. It is not the
responsibility of the government to maintain current addresses, or multiple addresses,
for all interested parties. 3 Thus, reliance on a summer address alone when that is the
only address readily available has been held adequate, 4 and notice mailed to the
dorrect address of the sole stockholder of a corporate property owner was sufficient
when it was also the address of the sole legatee of the corporate shares. 5
The majority ofjurisdictions that have addressed this issue, however, have held that
the government must undertake additional efforts when the mailed notice is
returned?" Reasonable diligence, under such reasoning, extends to checking records
of the secretary of state for corporate or partnership addresses, 7 or checking with a
229. See Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Elizondo v. Read, 588
N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Kakris v. Montbleau, 575 A.2d 1293, 1299 (N.H. 1990).
230. See Hoffman v. State, 871 P.2d 27,31 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Chavezv. Sharvelle, 750
P.2d 1119, 1122 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Snelgrove v. Lanham, 379 S.E.2d 904 (S.C. 1989).
But see Smith v. Breeding, 586 N.E.2d 932, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that failure of
tax auditor to record correct address from deed is not controlling when subsequent notices are
sent to correct address).
231. See Slattery v. Friedman, 636 A.2d 1, 7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Brewen v.
Leachman, 657 S.W.2d 698, 700-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
232. See Yoder v. Elkhart County Auditor, 632 N.E.2d 369, 373-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994);
Breeding, 586 N.E.2d at 937.
233. See Dahn v. Trownsell, 576 N.W.2d 535, 540 (S.D. 1998).
234. See McNaughton v. Kelsey, 698 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Me. 1997).
235. See Pompe v. City of Yonkers, 578 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586-88 (App. Div. 1992).
236. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Michigan, 976 F. Supp. 1085, 1088 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(holding that it was "reasonable to expect [the] county to obtain the proper address [of] a well
known national corporation"); Malone v. Robinson, 614 A.2d 33, 36 (D.C. 1992) (holding that
the statute requires additional efforts when notice letters are returned unclaimed); Bryant v.
T.C.B. Enters., 395 So. 2d 823 (La. Ct. App. 1981); City of Boston v. James, 530 N.E.2d
1254, 1256 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Patrick v. Rice, 814 P.2d 463, 467-68 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991); O'Brien v. Port Lawrence Title & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 1136 (Lucas County Ct. C.P.
1997) (holding that the government could have ascertained correct address available from other
property owned); Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P.2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989);
Michener v. Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau, 671 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1996); In re Tax Claim Bureau of Beaver County Tax Sale Sept. 10, 1990, 600 A.2d 650, 654
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Benton v. Logan, 474 S.E.2d 446 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996); Freeman v.
City of Kingsport, 926 S.W.2d 247,250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ("The issue of whether names
and addresses were reasonably ascertainable is a question of fact and must be determined upon
trial.").
237. See Scott v. Seek Lane Venture, Inc., 605 A.2d 942, 951 (Md. Ct. Sec. App. 1992)
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mortgagee 23 or title insurance company239 that is identified in the records and may
be in a position to provide a correct address for the interested party. Similar reasoning
has been applied where the government might have identified accurate addresses by
contacting the tenants occupying the subject property, 240 or a known attorney for an
interested party.24' Such duty may also extend to checking available telephone
directories. 24
2
Imposing a broader duty than examination of public records alone for the "last
known addresses" is justified in part by recognition of the shift which occurs when
tax liens are sold to a private investor. When the government holds the tax lien, its
sole interest is in the payment of taxes. When the lien is transferred to a private third
party purchaser, that party's interest is to maximize the return on its investment,
which may translate into minimum efforts to locate accurate addresses for interested
parties. 243 However, creating different statutory procedures for notification by the
government, and for notification by private purchasers of tax certificates, only
increases the potential confusion.2'
State and local government law largely controls the form of the notice to be
provided to interested parties, whether certified mail, registered mail return receipt
requested, or regular first class mail. The constitutional due process requirements do
not dictate a particular form of mailed notice to interested parties,245 and regular mail
(holding that there is a duty to check articles of incorporation of defunct corporation for
identity and addresses of directors); Tracy v. County of Chester, 489 A.2d 1334, 1338-39 (Pa.
1985).
238. See Nichol v. Howard, 684 A.2d 861, 866-67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Schreiber v.
Tax Claim Bureau, 545 A.2d 950, 955 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
239. See Giacobbi v. Hall, 707 P.2d 404, 408-09 (Idaho 1985); St. George Antiochian
Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 603 A.2d 484, 490-91 (Md. 1992).
240. See Kester v. Ives, 960 P.2d 865 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
241. See Gillespie v. Clay, 723 P.2d 263, 263 (Okla. 1986).
242. See Sinclair & Valentine Co. v. County of Los Angeles 247 Cal. Rptr. 568, 572 (Ct.
App. 1988); District of Columbia v. Mayhew, 601 A.2d 37, 44 (D.C. 1991); L. Brayton
Foundry Bldg., Inc. v. Santilli, 676 A.2d 1364, 1365-66 (R.I. 1996) (holding that a correct
address could have been determined by checking telephone directory). But see Elizondo v.
Read, 588 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992) (checking telephone directories is not required).
243. See Aggarwal, 603 A.2d at 490 ("[W]e believe an interpretation that would permit a
purchaser to engage in deliberate ignorance to the detriment of the owner's interest in the land
would be at least constitutionally suspect."); Slattery v. Friedman, 636 A.2d 1, 6 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1994) ("We also recognize that the holder of the certificate of sale has little
incentive to locate the owners of the property, and will often benefit if the owners are not
located.").
244. Butsee Mund v. Rambough, 432 N.W.2d 50,56 (N.D. 1988) (requiring different forms
of notice depending on the party enforcing the delinquent tax lien procedure does not violate
equal protection).
245. See Tulsa Prof'I Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) ("[M]ail
service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice."); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,798 (1983) ("When the
mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by
publication must be supplemented by notice actually mailed to the mortgagee's last known
available address or by personal service.").
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has been held to be sufficient to meet federal due process standards.246 It is entirely
possible, however, that a state constitution may be interpreted to require certified or
registered mail notice as a form of greater assurance of actual notice.
24 7
The open texture of "reasonably diligent efforts" makes it quite difficult to
determine whether the government has undertaken sufficient actions to notify
interested parties, as indicated by the breadth ofjudicial interpretations of this duty.
If notices are sent, but are returned as unclaimed or undeliverable, it is hard to see
how the absence of any further efforts to locate a correct address could be equated
with reasonably diligent efforts. 4 The burden is on the governmental actor to
demonstrate that it has exercised such diligence, whether by checking other public
records available to it, telephone directories, or potential leads found in the public
records. There is, for example, little reason not to send a copy of the notice to the
address ofthe property being foreclosed, addressed simply to "Occupant," as well as
addressed to the name of the owner or owners.249 As a matter of prudence, and in
order to demonstrate its efforts to locate addresses of interested parties, the
governmental actor should maintain records of all notices returned and a checklist of
all supplemental steps undertaken to identify correct addresses.
E. Request Notice Statutes
As constitutional jurisprudence has evolved toward a requirement of notice to all
interested parties, the balance between the burdens this places on the government and
the responsibilities that should be borne by property owners has continued to be a
major public policy struggle. The tensions among the early twentieth century
perspectives on the efficient collection of taxes, the "caretaker" approach to property
ownership, and the protection of property rights are all present in the determination
of the extent of duties placed on the government in locating accurate names and
addresses for interested parties. One solution, advocated by numerous commentators,
adopted by many jurisdictions, and sustained by many courts, is a statutory "request
notice" procedure. Such a procedure permits any party with an interest in real
property to file a request to receive copies of notices of tax delinquency and tax
enforcement proceedings concerning the property. This approach minimizes the
burden on the government to search for parties who have moved, or who can't be
located, and relies upon the diligence and responsibility of the property owner, or
interested party, to file the appropriate request for notice. The argument is that if the
request is properly filed, the party must be given notice of the proceeding; if not, the
246. See United Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. #7, 922 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.
1991); Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1988).
247. See Dow v. State, 240 N.W.2d 450, 459 (Mich. 1976); see also Weigner, 852 F.2d at
654 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (notice should be given by certified or registered mail).
248. See In re O.B. Campbell, 574 So. 2d 539,541 (La. Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]e do not have
to test the reasonableness of the subsequent steps taken by the tax collector, for by his own
testimony, nothing was done; no steps were taken.").
249. But see Yoder v. Elkhart County Auditor, 632 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that notice mailed to a "last known address" but not the address of the property was
sufficient).
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government need only give notice to parties and addresses as they appear in the
government's records.
The policy justification for the adequacy of the request notice approach is that it
affords a means of protecting property interests while still permitting the enforcement
of property tax obligations by local governments. This procedural balance of rights
and duties was advocated by one commentator forty years ago shortly after the
Mullane decision,25 and by another in the aftermath of Mennonite.25' The Supreme
Court, in Mennonite, expressly left open the question of the constitutional adequacy
of a request notice statute,252 and a substantial number of jurisdictions continue to
make this procedure available to interested parties.2 3 The issue is whether the ability
of an interested party to file a request notice strikes a constitutionally acceptable
balance and relieves the government of its obligation to provide notice when the
interested party has failed to request notice.
Judicial decisions which have sustained the adequacy of a request notice statute
have emphasized that the ability of an interested party to protect itself by filing a
request for notice is but one factor which must be evaluated and balanced under the
Supreme Court's proposition that "whether a particular method of notice is
reasonable depends upon the particular circumstances." 2 The balancing involves
weighing the balancing of the governmental efforts in undertaking a full title
examination and checking other sources of information as against the relatively small
burden imposed upon an interested party of filing of a request for notice.255 Other
250. See Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257,
1268 (1957).
251. See Ellen F. Friedman, Note, The Constitutionality ofRequest Notice Provisions in In
Rem Tax Foreclosures, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1209 (1988); see also Jeanni Atkins et al., The
Threat to Notice by Publication Posed by Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 21 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 107, 110'(1994) ("Shifting the full burden of responsibility for protecting
property interests from the individual to the State runs counter to the historical constitutional
justification of constructive notice by publication which is based on the caretaker
theory .... ").
252. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 793 n.2 (1983).
253. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.350 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.344(2) (West
Supp. 1999); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-135 (West Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §
6-1.1-24-3(b) (Michie 1998); IOWA CODEANN. § 446.9(3) (West Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47:2180.1(A) (West 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, §§ 38,39 (Law. Co-op. 1990);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 211.57(4) (West 1998), amended by 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 123,
§ 57(4); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 276.041 (West 1999); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.5648(I)(c)
(Michie Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-104.48 (West 1986); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 1126(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 312.140 (Lexis Supp. 1998); 53
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7193.1 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-240 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-23-2.2 (Michie 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3926 (Michie
1997); W. VA. CODE § I IA-3-3 (1995).
254. Tulsa Prof I Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988); see Matter of
Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (App. Div. 1987), appeal dismissed, 512
N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1987), afd on other grounds, 522 N.E.2d 1044 (N.Y. 1988) (finding that
a procedure permitting the filing of an in rem card, entitling the owner to mailed notice, was
a reasonable and balanced approach).
255. See Davis Oil Co. v: Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1989); Mid-State Homes,
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judicial decisions have sustained the adequacy of request notice statutes but only
because state or local law required some form of mailed notice to be provided even
when a request for notice was absent .
6
The majority of the courts that have directly confronted this issue have reached a
different conclusion by emphasizing two aspects of the Mennonite reasoning. The
first proposition is that the ability of an interested party to protect itself by filing a
request for notice does not relieve the government of its constitutional obligations. 7
The fact that many owners, and mortgagees, may possess sufficient sophistication to
adopt procedures to avoid the loss of property interests in tax foreclosures is not a
justification for undercutting the foundation of due process analysis.25 The second
proposition recasts the balancing in a dramatically different fashion. The appropriate
balancing involves "the relatively modest administrative burden of providing notice
by mail" 9 as against the property rights of an interested party.
The first proposition is the cornerstone of most of the judicial decisions that have
rejected the presence of a request notice statute as an adequate substitute for the
government's obligation to provide notice.2" The ability of interested parties to use
a request notice statute to protect their interests does not shift the responsibility of
adequate notice away from the government.26' Parallel arguments that failure to take
advantage ofa request notice provision constitutes a waiver of the right to notice have
been quickly rejected.6 2
Inc. v. Portis, 652 F. Supp. 640,644-45 (W.D. La. 1987); Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501,
503-04 (Ind. 1992); Miller Reeder Co. v. Farmers State Bank of Wyatt, 588 N.E.2d 506, 506-
07 (Ind. 1992); Skow, supra note 226 (discussing an equitable compromise for due process
notice protection of property interests).
256. See ISCA Enters. v. City of New York, 572 N.E.2d 610, 615-17 (N.Y. 1991); Grant
County v. Guyer, 672 P.2d 702, 707 (Or. 1983).
257. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799 ("More importantly, a party's ability to take steps to
safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation.").
258. See id. ("[I]t may well be the least sophisticated creditor whose security interest is
threatened by a tax sale.").
259. Id. at 800.
260. See Parkview Oak Subdiv. Corp. v. Tridico, 667 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (La. Ct. App.
1995); Township ofJefferson v. Block 447A, Lot 10, 548 A.2d 521,524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) ("[A] person's entitlement to the notice required by due process cannot be
conditioned on the requirement that he request it."); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the
County of Erie, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (App. Div. 1984) ("The State has an obligation to all
mortgagees, not merely those who request notice."); Sunburst Bank v. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d
1, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
261. See Wyliev. Patton, 720 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Idaho App. 1986); Seattle-FirstNat'l Bank
v. Umatilla County, 713 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); see also USX Corp. v. H.H.
Champlin, 992 F.2d 1380, 1385 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that, although state law did not
mandate notice to parties who failed to comply with request notice statute, the Fourteenth
Amendment did require notice); United States v. Malinka, 685 P.2d 405,408 (Okla. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that, even though a mortgagee "might take certain steps to protect its own
interest," the burden is on the state to provide notice).
262. See Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 787 (5th Cir. 1989); FDIC v. Lee, 933 F.
Supp. 577, 580-81 (E.D. La. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 130 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 1997);
Murchison v. Marzullo, 705 So. 2d 1129, 1130-31 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
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The second proposition rejects the view that the burdens to be balanced are the
relative costs oftitle examinations and the costs of filing a request fornotice.263 "Such
a novel system undoubtedly would provide notice in a uniform and orderly manner,
but efficiency is not the standard-bearer of due process. Indeed, efficient governance
and due process struggle in an inherently tense relationship." 2 Instead, the
appropriate balance is one that compares the lack of difficulty in checking records for
recorded interests with the significance of property rights of the interested parties.265
When the identity and addresses of holders of protected property interests are
readily ascertainable, the failure of such parties to file a request for notice is no
substitute for notice required by due process. There is still, however, an important
justification for use of a request notice procedure. Because there is no absolute
requirement of mailed notice, with notice to be given only when the identity and
addresses of interested parties are readily ascertainable, a request notice statute can
afford an additional means by which a party can ensure that notice will be given. 2 1
There are numerous contexts in which a party's interests may not be readily
ascertainable, such as when a party's interest is not recorded in public records, a
contested probate proceeding leaves ownership in doubt, or a mortgagee transfers the
servicing of the loan or pledges it as collateral. A request notice statute, in such
circumstances, fills the gap between the constitutional obligation of notice to those
who are readily ascertainable, and those who are not, without imposing
"extraordinary efforts"2 67 in the process.
F. Consequences of Inadequate Notice
Upon finding that an interested party has not received notice in accordance with the
requirements of due process, a court must determine the consequences that flow from
such a violation. 261 There are essentially two forms of relief that a court is likely to
award. The first is to declare the entire tax enforcement proceeding, or some portion
263. See Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 22, Lots 14, 15, 16, 528 A.2d 98, 101 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (holding that mailed notice is not an exceptional burden on the municipality
and that "[t]he property rights of a mortgagee or other lien holder are substantial"); Alliance
Property Management & Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, Inc., 518 N.Y.S.2d 804,805-06
(App. Div. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 517 N.E.2d 1327 (N.Y. 1987).
264. Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio, 878 F.2d 883, 892 (5th Cir. 1989).
265. See Seattle-First Nat ' Bank, 713 P.2d at 37; see also McCann v. Scaduto, 519 N.E.2d
309, 314 (N.Y. 1987) ("We conclude that the tax lien sale, in the context of this Code, creates
'momentous consequences' for the homeowner and that-balanced against these
consequences-requiring that a notice be mailed to a person whose name and address are
known imposes a minimal burden on the County.").
266. See Small Engine Shop, Inc., 878 F.2d at 893; Lee, 933 F. Supp. at 581 ("[The] statute
... allows those with interest in property, who are not reasonably ascertainable to a diligent
state actor, an opportunity to request such notice."); Island Fin, Inc. v. Ballman, 607 A.2d 76,
81-82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
267. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1983).
268. See generally Nora A. Uehlein, Annotation, Right of Interested Party Receiving Due
Notice of Tax Sale or ofRight To Redeem To Assert Failure or Insufficiency ofNotice to Other
Interested Party, 45 A.L.R.4th 447 (1986) (summarizing split in jurisdictions on ability of
omitted third parties to contest validity of sale).
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of it, null and void.269 The second is to sustain the validity of the tax enforcement
proceeding as to all parties that did receive adequate notice, leaving the interest of the
party that did not receive notice unaffected by the proceeding.
When it is the owner in fee simple, or its heirs, successors, or assigns by operation
of law, who was not given notice of the tax sale or the end of the redemption period,
the plausible result is to void the entire proceeding, or at least that portion of it for
which notice was not properly given, as to such owner and as to all other interested
parties even if they did receive adequate notice.27 Though not required as a matter
of constitutional due process, such an approach is necessary as a matter of equity. To
void a proceeding only as to an underlying fee owner, permitting the fee owner to
redeem the property from the lien or sale, while terminating the rights ofmortgagees,
judgment creditors, and other subordinate parties, would likely result in an unjustified
windfall for the fee owner. The fee owner could obtain clear title to the property
without those encumbrances that previously affected the property. Depending upon
the statutory nature of tax enforcement proceedings, it is also plausible to conclude
that the lack of adequate notice constituted a fundamental defect that deprived the
original proceeding of adequate jurisdiction.271 The lack of jurisdiction from
constitutionally inadequate notice goes directly to the issue of the applicability of a
statute of limitations barring challenges to the validity of a tax deed. Ifjurisdiction
was lacking initially, any such statute should be inapplicable.272
When the underlying fee owner receives adequate notice of the enforcement
proceeding, but amortgagee,judgment creditor, lessee, or other interested party is not
given constitutionally adequate notice, alternative forms of relief are possible. One
is to follow the same approach as in the case of owners who do not receive notice,
and void the entire proceeding as to all parties, requiring that the enforcement
269. It is also possible, of course, for a court to determine that part of all interest, penalties,
and costs which accrued during a period of time for which notice was not adequately provided
should be eliminated, and, in certain circumstances, it may be possible for an aggrieved party
to pursue a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See supra note 102.
270. See Rives v. Bulsa, 478 S.E.2d 878, 881 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("Failure to give the
required notice [of tax sale to true owner] is a fundamental defect in tax [sale] proceedings
which renders proceedings absolutely void."); see also Turkey Creek, LLC v. Rosania, 953
P.2d 1306, 1313 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that failure to comply with statutory notice
requirements may render tax deed void).
271. See Benoitv. Panthaky, 780 F.2d 336,339 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Constitutionally inadequate
notice to the owner of the property sold at atax foreclosure is ajurisdictional defect."); Moran
v. Robbin, 863 P.2d 395,398 (Mont. 1993) ("The giving of notice isjurisdictional; if the legal
requirements with respect to notice are not complied with, a county treasurer may not legally
issue atax deed."); Good v. Kennedy, 352 S.E.2d 708, 711 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the requirement of adequate notice is jurisdictional prerequisite).
272. See Luster v. Bank of Chelsea, 730 P.2d 506, 510 (Okla. 1986). But the Michigan
Court of Appeals in Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condo. Ass', 573 N.W.2d 296 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997), held that failure to provide notice rendered the tax deed void, and the statute of
limitations was tolled by such a fundamental lack of jurisdiction. The Michigan Supreme
Court, however, vacated and remanded for reconsideration of summary judgment motions in
light of a statutory provision barring actions challenging tax deeds after six months. See Smith
v. Cliffs on the Bay Condo. Ass'n, 589 N.W.2d 779, 779-80 (Mich. 1998).
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proceedings be recommenced.2" Such an approach, once again, might be necessary
as a matter of equity to avoid the situation where a senior creditor receives adequate
notice, and fails to redeem the property, but a junior creditor who does not receive
notice is given the opportunity to redeem because of the constitutional violation. This
would grant a windfall to the junior creditor, placing it in a better position than before
the proceedings commenced. Declaring the entire proceeding void as to all parties
may also be justified in light of the fact that the cost of redeeming property from a tax
lien or tax sale may be but a small fraction of the fair market value of the property.
If a creditor, as a matter of constitutional relief, is permitted to redeem the property
and thereby acquire ownership of the property, it could be gaining all equity in the
property at the expense of the owner who received notice, yet failed to redeem.27
Thus, when the party who fails to receive the constitutionally adequate notice is a
mortgagee or other subordinate creditor, the equitable result in most contexts would
be to void the entire proceeding.
The second approach is to sustain the validity of the sale as to owners and creditors
who did receive adequate notice, but hold that the sale is ineffective as to other
interested parties who failed to receive adequate notice, such as the holder of a
leasehold interest, a future interest, or an easement or covenant. In this situation, a
purchaser at a tax sale will acquire the property free and clear of all interests which
received proper notice, but the property will continue to be encumbered by leases,
future interests, easements, and covenants which were not given notice of the
proceeding.27
G. Hearings
As a general proposition, the deprivation of property interests by the state triggers
not only the provision of adequate notice, but also the right to be heard. The nature
of the hearing is dependent on the nature of the right and the context of the
deprivation, a "hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 76 The scope of the right
to a hearing was not addressed by the Supreme Court in Mennonite, and two state
supreme courts have reached differing conclusions. One held that while there does
not have to be a judicial hearing on the foreclosure, an opportunity to be heard in an
administrative hearing with ultimate recourse to the judiciary is constitutionally
required.21 The other has interpreted the underlying statutory procedures to be purely
ministerial in nature, with no fact finding or adjudicative function by the tax collector
273. See FDIC v. Lee, 933 F. Supp. 577, 581 (E.D. La. 1996) ("The tax sale in question was
constitutionally deficient and thus void ab initio. Consequently, the sale, from its inception,
was null.").
274. This issue does not seem to have been presented to those courts which have held a
mortgage unaffected by a tax foreclosure without adequate notice. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch
Employees' Credit Union v. Davis, 899 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1995).
275. See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 9, § 8750 (1989) (stating thatfailure to give notice only means
that the interests of those parties are unaffected); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-43-11 (1999) ("A
failure to give the required notice to such lienors shall render the tax title void as to such
lienors ....").
276. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
277. See Dow v. State, 240 N.W.2d 450, 460 (Mich. 1976).
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or by the judiciary, and concluded that due process does not require a hearing.278 In
tax foreclosure proceedings the issues which could be contested are usually very
narrow in scope: the delinquency of the taxes, the adequacy of notice, and compliance
with statutory procedures. Challenges to the original imposition of liability for taxes
do carry a right to a hearing,279 but once proceedings are commenced for enforcement
of a lien for delinquent property taxes, questions of the validity of the assessment and
rate of taxation usually cannot be raised. The ability of a property owner to contest
tax liability during the assessment process is frequently coupled with the "caretaker"
rationale and the importance of taxation to government as justification for concluding
that no hearing is required by due process at the stage of a property tax foreclosure."'
V. A REVISED APPROACH TO PROPERTY
TAX LIEN ENFORCEMENT
The evolution over the last fifty years of constitutional standards of notice required
by due process presents a direct challenge to the collection of delinquent property
taxes by state and local governments. As state and local governments moved to adopt
simpler in rem procedures relying on notice by publication, the Supreme Court
moved in the opposite direction, increasing the notice requirements of due process
applicable to all state actions. As local governments expanded the steps and stages in
the foreclosure process, courts looked at each step as possibly triggering a notice
requirement. As jurisdictions sought to place responsibility for requesting notice on
interested parties, they learned that the constitutional duties of the state could not be
shifted so easily. As tax collectors sought to provide notice only to those parties
identified in their own records, they discovered that their constitutional duty included
examining other public records and exercising reasonably diligent efforts.
The collection of delinquent property taxes is far too important to the fiscal and
social health of our communities to continue in the direction of increasing complexity
and uncertainty. Financial pressures are increasing as responsibilities devolve from
the federal to the local levels, and the property tax remains one of the few sources of
revenues entirely within the control of local governments. When even a small
percentage of a property tax digest lingers with delinquent taxes for years, there can
be a devastating impact on neighborhood and community development. The attempts
of local governments to relieve part of their financial pressures by the sale and
securitization of billions of dollars in delinquent tax receivables will run head long
into legal doubts about the enforceability of the underlying security.
Instead of further expanding the procedures and steps in the enforcement of
property tax liens, with additional constitutional duties at each step, the reform needs
to be in the opposite direction. There are two components to a property tax
278. See Associates Fin. Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Sorenson, 700 A.2d 107, 111 (Conn. Ct.
App. 1997), cert. granted, 704 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1997), appeal dismissed, 710 A.2d 769
(Conn. 1998).
279. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1994); see also Leger v. Commissioner
of Revenue, 654 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1995) (holding that due process does not require a hearing
prior to the imposition of a lien for taxes).
280. See McNaughton v. Kelsey, 698 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Me. 1997); City of Auburn v.
Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22, 29-30 (Me. 1974).
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foreclosure procedure that is efficient, fair, and consistent with constitutional rights
and duties. First, there should be a single enforcement event. Second, constitutionally
adequate notice should be provided to all interested parties only once for the single
event. The property tax is one of the most difficult of all forms of public revenue to
administer; the enforcement of delinquent property tax liens should be, and can be,
one of the simplest parts of this complex system.
A. A Single Enforcement Proceeding
A property tax lien enforcement proceeding which relies upon two or more distinct
events creates the most difficult possible circumstances for compliance with
constitutional due process notice requirements. Far too commonly, this consists of an
initial event in which the property is sold but the sale is not deemed complete or final
until some final event is taken such as termination of the right of redemption. These
two events are usually not tied together as part of a single proceeding, nor are they
necessarily initiated by the same entities. Though there may be a minimum period of
time separating the two events, there is rarely a fixed period of time within which the
second event must happen. The party holding the right to the final event of
enforcement of the tax foreclosure frequently has discretion as to when the
proceeding will be initiated. The presence of two separate events controlled by
separate parties and separated in time by a range of months or years, triggers the need
for adequate notice to all interested parties of both events.
The longer the period of time between the initial tax enforcement event and the
final event which terminates the rights of all interested parties in the absence of
redemption, the greater the difficulty of identifying the interests and identifying
names and addresses for the interested parties. A property tax enforcement
proceeding which requires six months to complete is difficult. One that involves
multiple events over one to five years ends up creating precisely the kind of
extraordinary burden on the government which the "caretaker" theory seeks to
avoid."8' Over a period of years it is highly probable with respect to any given tract
of property that new property interests will be created, interests will be transferred,
and owners of various property interests will change addresses, if not identities. A
multistaged proceeding spread out over a period of years and controlled by different
entities with different motivations faces significant burdens of providing
constitutionally adequate notice at each stage of the process.
The tax enforcement proceeding should consist of a single event, thus allowing
comprehensive and constitutionally adequate notice to be given only once at the
initiation of the proceeding. Notice of the tax enforcement proceeding, whether
judicial or nonjudicial in nature, should be filed in the appropriate lis pendens docket,
or such other public record as is maintained to reflect pending litigation involving the
property. Such filings will constitute notice under the recording acts of all
jurisdictions of the pendency of the proceedings, and any and all parties who acquire
interests after the initiation of the proceedings will do so subject to the enforcement
proceedings.
281. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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The length of the tax enforcement proceeding should be as short as possible. It
should be long enough only to ensure that all interested parties received proper notice
and have a reasonable amount of time to respond to the notice by payment or by
seeking a hearing to challenge the proceeding. Because the consequences of a
property tax enforcement proceeding are so significant, involving a loss of all
property rights and ownership interests even when the amount of delinquent taxes is
extremely small relative to the value of the property interests, all jurisdictions have
sought to soften this potential loss by providing additional periods of time by which
owners and interested parties can protect their interests.212 Traditionally, such
additional periods of time have been statutory redemption periods after the sale of the
property. This approach, however, multiplies the difficulty of providing notice by
requiring notice of separate events. A simpler, more efficient approach which still
affirms the ability of owners to avoid the loss of property rights within months after
taxes are delinquent is to shift the extended period of time before the commencement
of enforcement proceedings. Thus, if ajurisdiction elects as a matter of public policy
to provide owners and other interested parties with a one- to two-year period of time
before the final loss of all property rights, such a period should be established as the
minimum period oftime which must pass after the initial date of tax delinquency and
before the commencement of enforcement proceedings. Shifting the redemption
period from postsale to presale of the property affirms the policy protections of
property owners, and yet still permits the enforcement in a single proceeding
requiring only a short period of time. If a jurisdiction desires to retain a postsale
redemption period, it should be a minimal period of time such as thirty days, the
expiration of which is automatic in the absence of redemption. The expiration of a
short postsale redemption period must be recited in the deed or judicial proceedings,
and be available as a matter of public record.
Part of the current constitutional complexity in the enforcement of property tax
liens derives from the different roles played by different parties. Commonly, the local
government conducts an initial sale of the property, and sells it to a third party. It is
then within the authority and control of the third party to terminate the right of
redemption and otherwise acquire the final tax deed. Not only are multiple notices
and title examinations likely to be required of these separate events, but they leave
the owners and other interested parties with the responsibility of identifying both the
fact of the initial sale and the purchaser at the initial sale. Instead, the commencement
and completion of the tax enforcement proceedings should be within the control of
a single entity. If the governmental entity retains the lien for property taxes, the
governmental entity should initiate and complete the tax enforcement proceeding. If
the government has sold or transferred the tax lien to a third party, the responsibility
for the entire tax enforcement proceeding should rest on the holder of the tax lien.
It will simplify the tax enforcement proceedings considerably if there is only one
event or sale involving transfer of title to the property. If the jurisdiction permits the
transfer of a property tax lien, whether by sale of individual liens or through
negotiated bulk sale transfers, it should be clear that the lien for delinquent property
taxes is the only subject matter of the sale. To avoid any possible confusion that the
property is being sold, the consideration to be paid at the transfer of a lien should be
282. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
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limited to the value of the lien, that is, delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs.
The transfer by a governmental entity to a third party of a property tax lien is not, and
should not, be part of an enforcement proceeding. Thus, the transfer of the lien does
not, as a matter of constitutional due process, require separate notice to the owner and
other interested parties of the transfer. Notice of such a transfer may be required as
a matter of other public policies, but is not constitutionally mandated.
The mechanics of the sale process are not determined as a matter of federal
constitutional law. Assuming the provision of adequate notice and opportunity for a
hearing, state governments should be free to follow a procedure of strict
foreclosure-vesting title in a governmental entity at the completion of the
enforcement proceedings--or to conduct an auction of the property. At the auction
the property can be sold either to the highest bidder (above a minimum bid of taxes,
interest, penalties, and costs), or to the purchaser who bids for a lowest percentage
undivided interest in the property. The former procedure poses issues with respect to
the receipt, control, and distribution of surplus funds bid in excess of the minimum
bid. The latter procedure poses issues with respect to the subsequent marketability of
fractional, undivided interests in the property. If the enforcement proceeding is short
in duration, without any subsequent lengthy redemption period, there should be no
need to follow the approach of those jurisdictions that sell the property to the
purchaser offering the lowest rate of interest during a postsale redemption period.
At the present time there is no federal constitutional directive as to whether the
property tax enforcement proceedings should be entirely nonjudicial in nature,
exclusively judicial, or some combination of the two. What is now clear is that the
presence of state action compels compliance with the guarantees of due process. The
historic advantages, in terms of speed and efficiency, of a nonjudicial in rem
proceeding, with constructive notice only by publication and no requirements of
judicial jurisdiction, are no longer available. The property rights of owners and other
interested parties are entitled to constitutional protection regardless of the nature of
the proceeding.
There are several distinct advantages to the utilization of ajudicial tax enforcement
proceeding. First, ajudicial proceeding will constitute a permanent public record of
all aspects of the proceeding. The identification of interested parties, the provision of
notice to such parties, and the exercise of reasonably diligent efforts to locate names
and addresses of such parties, will all constitute a part of the official records and
contain formal findings of fact by the judiciary. Significantly, a judicial proceeding
will clearly offer an opportunity for a hearing as part of the process-an opportunity
not presently available in most jurisdictions. A judicial order of sale and issuance of
a final tax deed will be res judicata of the issues and parties before the court,
establishing a foundation for subsequent title insurance and transfers of the property.
The primary argument against reliance on judicial proceedings to enforce property
tax liens is the burden upon the judiciary. The nature of judicial property tax
enforcement proceedings, however, should and could be limited in scope. The sole
issues to be decided by a court would be the existence of the delinquency and the
provision of adequate notice. There is no structural or constitutional reason why such
proceedings would not be relatively brief, and could not be conducted in large
volumes.
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B. Notice
ConstitutionaIjurisprudence now holds that due process requires notice in property
tax enforcement proceedings, but it is notice that is reasonably calculated to inform
interested parties whose identity is reasonably ascertainable based upon reasonably
diligent efforts. The elusive nature of this constitutional test poses significant barriers
to predictability, certainty, and stability in the tax foreclosure process. It leaves
property owners and other interested parties subject to the vagaries of local law and
particularized judicial conceptions of reasonableness. It also casts continuing doubt
on the insurability and marketability of properties.
The only effective and efficient response to this elusive constitutional standard is
to undertake a comprehensive approach to providing notice to all possible interested
parties. If property tax enforcement proceedings consist of a single proceeding, this
notice is to be given only once, at the initiation of the proceeding. The interests that
are entitled to adequate notice include all property interests which would be
terminated or adversely affected by the tax enforcement proceeding. The
identification of all such interests will almost never be revealed solely by the records
of the tax collector, as such records usually identify only the owner in fee simple of
the subject property. A purchaser under a long term installment land sale contract
may have greater financial interests in the property than a seller, but the interests of
the purchaser are not necessarily reflected in the tax collector's records. Mortgages
are clearly protected property interests, and there is no substantive distinction for
these purposes between mortgages and judgment creditors. Similarly, there is no
necessary distinction, as a matter of the existence of enforceable property rights,
between a mortgage and a leasehold estate that encumbers a tract of property.
There is now no substitute for an examination of title to reveal the existence of the
interests that will be affected by a tax enforcement proceeding. The government has
a constitutional obligation to identify those interests which exist as a matter of public
record, and such records include not just the tax collector's records, but also the
public records maintained for purposes of providing notice of the creation and
transfer of interests in real property. This examination should be done immediately
prior to the commencement of the enforcement proceedings, and notice should be
provided to all parties holding identified interests.
It is also likely that a legally enforceable interest in real property will not be
revealed in the public records. The rights of occupants of property under unrecorded
leases, and parties in possession for extended periods of time without evidence of
record, should also receive constitutional protection when notice can be provided to
them without creating extraordinary burdens on the government. Because such notice
can be provided simply by mailing an extra copy of the notice addressed to the
"Occupant," and by posting a copy of the notice on the property, the burden is light.
Though a jurisdiction may elect to require more formal service of process as to
particular classes of interested parties, such as residents, what the Constitution
requires as a minimum is notice reasonably calculated to inform the interested parties
of the proceedings, and mailed notice will suffice in most circumstances. Because
reasonably diligent efforts are required, it would be advantageous to utilize registered
mail, or certified mail return receipt requested, to transmit the notice. The scope of
the government's duties when mailed notice is returned, or when adequate addresses
are not revealed by a title examination, is the most problematic aspect of a revised
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property tax enforcement proceeding. While it is accurate that the government does
not have the duty to maintain at all times accurate addresses for all interested parties,
it is still incumbent upon the government to undertake some efforts to obtain correct
addresses. No efforts can not equate with reasonably diligent efforts. As part of the
administration of the tax enforcement proceeding, the government should maintain
a checklist of actions taken with respect to returned notices and insufficient addresses.
Such a checklist should include a review of other resources for more accurate
information.
A request notice statute is not an adequate substitute for the performance of the
government's constitutional obligations. It may still serve, however, a valuable
function by permitting interested parties whose identities and addresses are not
reasonably ascertainable to file necessary information with the tax collector's office.
It should always be supplemental to, and not in lieu of, the constitutionally required
notice.
Notice by publication, or constructive notice, continues to be constitutionally
adequate when the identities of interested parties are not available through reasonably
diligent efforts. Because there is always the possibility that unrecorded interests exist,
or that notice is not received by all interested parties, notice of the commencement
of tax enforcement proceedings should also be published. In many jurisdictions
publication of notice serves two different functions, and care must be taken to
differentiate these functions. One function of published notice is to apprise interested
parties of the initiation of tax enforcement proceedings. The second function is to
advertise the existence of a public auction, or sale, of the property in order to
encourage prospective purchasers. The first function is that which is constitutionally
required. The second function is purely a matter of local procedures and should
occur, if at all, at a separate date when the time of the sale is known.
VI. CONCLUSION
Property tax enforcement procedures have always involved a delicate balance of
public and private rights and duties. The caretaker premise assumes that all property
owners and interested parties have some degree of responsibility with respect to the
care and management of their property interests. They are held to the knowledge that
their property is potentially subject to taxation, and particularized notice of the annual
imposition ofa property tax rate is not constitutionally required. The government may
impose taxes, interest, and penalties upon nonpayment. This caretaker premise, and
the special nature of taxation as central to government operations, continue to be
dominant forces in our culture. Where they have been modified by changing
constitutional jurisprudence in recent decades is in the subtle, yet significant shift in
the role of notice in this delicate balance.
Expansion of the notice requirements increases the burden imposed on state and
local governments in conducting property tax enforcement proceedings, but the
magnitude of this burden can be offset by a reform of existing tax foreclosure
proceedings. Shifting to a single stage enforcement proceeding, in which the final
event concludes all issues of ownership, dramatically reduces the number of times in
which notice must be given and increases the accuracy of the notice that is given.
Even when jurisdictions retain a presale redemption period, or grace period, prior to
the commencement of enforcement proceedings, a single enforcement proceeding
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routinely brought atthe end of such period will eliminate much of the uncertainty and
instability which currently plagues property owners and contributes to the
deterioration of inner cities by abandoned tax delinquent properties. The costs of
property tax enforcement proceedings have always been included in the amount
necessary to redeem the property from the tax lien, and the additional costs associated
with the examination of title and other reasonably diligent efforts to locate the
interested parties should be included as well.
An enforcement proceeding that can be commenced, and completed, in a relatively
short period of time eliminates the necessity of the more indirect coercion that is used
by many jurisdictions in the form of substantial, and cumulative, penalties that accrue
with the passage of time. Ironically, as penalties mount towards the fair market value
of the property, owners and interested parties have even less incentive to redeem the
property from the tax lien or to manage the property. When the redemption amount
equals or exceeds the fair market value of the property, there will be no sale of the
property at a public auction, and a statutory provision should be made for transfer of
the property to the local government, or a special purpose entity, for public use or for
resale.
As state and local governments respond to the challenges presented by evolving
federal constitutional law, reform of property tax enforcement procedures should not
be limited to the mere addition of yet another approach to the procedures which have
been in place for over a century. Reform in the past has simply added steps or stages
to existing laws, or added new procedures as additional options available to local
governments. The result is a patchwork of laws that is confusing, inconsistent, and in
large measure constitutionally deficient. The existing laws should be replaced entirely
by a simpler, single enforcement proceeding in which comprehensive notice is
provided once, at the commencement of the proceeding, to all interested parties.
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